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Overview
American constitutional interpretation and theory remain prison-
ers of an excessively narrow perspective of the Constitution. Such
perspective is limited by entrenched assumptions about constitutional
history and a blinding fixation on the federal document. These
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preconceptions suggest the inevitability of the received wisdom about
American constitutionalism, constraining the debate and delimiting
the range of constitutional ideas. Expanding the arena in which the
contemporary play of ideas occurs is conceptually difficult and has
met with considerable resistance. A more complete account of the
American experience with written constitutions reveals much com-
plexity and forces us to re-evaluate many of our most cherished con-
stitutional beliefs.
This Article explores the revolutionary period and the early na-
tional period of American constitutionalism, examining popular sov-
ereignty as the foundation of American governance and political
power. It intends to challenge standard perspectives on American
constitutionalism, in particular the notion that the United States Con-
stitution was the model constitution and reflected the mature, com-
plete understanding of how to translate revolutionary theory into
republican practice. The Federal Constitution was not the culmina-
tion of the "correct" understanding of popular sovereignty, but merely
one version that ultimately produced a distinct constitutional tradi-
tion. An alternative vision, however, existed, survived, and gave co-
herence to a rather different tradition of constitution-making and
revision. The validity and vitality of that tradition has largely been
muted by two hundred years of Federal Constitution worship.'
This Article discusses the tensions between broader and narrower
visions of constitutional possibilities and how those two visions
formed and re-formed in the early constitutional experience of the
states. This early, developmental period of constitutional formation is
viewed through the lens of a series of questions that Americans con-
tinued to struggle with in constitutional conventions and as they
thought about constitutional revision. These questions sprang from
popular sovereignty and concerned the role of legislatures in framing
constitutions, the necessity of popular ratification, the people who
could create constitutions, and the limits, if any, to constitutional
change.
Popular sovereignty was the dynamic concept that underlay the
American Revolution. By examining rarely utilized sources, one can
1. Joyce Appleby has made a similar point about the Anti-Federalists and the consti-
tutional possibilities they anticipated. See Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The
Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 806 (1987); see also Richard E. Ellis, The Persis-
tence of Anti-Federalism After 1789, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGmIS OF THE CON-
sTrTToN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTrrY 295, 297 (Richard Beeman et al. eds.,
1987); Pauline Maier, The Road Not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, and the Revolu-
tionary Tradition in South Carolina, 82 S.C. HisT. MAG. 1 (1981).
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see that the development of American constitutionalism was inter-
twined with deliberations and perceptions about popular sovereignty.2
Indeed, popular sovereignty became the central challenge to Ameri-
cans in establishing republican governments. Americans were both
united in accepting popular sovereignty as the foundational principle
of their governments and divided over how to implement the princi-
ple. As Americans framed and reframed answers to popular sover-
eignty, a complex and conflicted American constitutional tradition
emerged that departed in many important respects from the concep-
tion of constitutionalism embodied in the Federal Constitution.
Moreover, that divergent tradition continued to enjoy a vibrant
life long after 1787. State constitutions and state constitution-makers
embraced a far more expansive view of popular sovereignty, while the
Federal Constitution and its Framers reflected a constrained view of
the people's right to alter or abolish their government. The coexis-
tence of these competing perceptions of popular sovereignty hinged
2. This Article emerges from a broader study of the American debate over the impli-
cations of popular sovereignty from the Revolution until the end of the nineteenth century.
That study analyzes all the extant debates of state constitutional conventions of that period
as well as contemporary and scholarly accounts of such conventions. Well over 200 state
constitutional conventions have been held since the eighteenth century. See Albert L.
Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 57-84 (1982).
Because the first published debates appeared only in the 1820s, the work and under-
standings of prior state constitution-makers must largely be gleaned from sources other
than published debates, such as newspaper accounts, private papers, and the often cryptic
proceedings and minutes of those conventions. Ironically, state constitution-making during
the 1820s and 1830s has received disproportionate attention, given the fact that the best
evidence of the thought of delegates-the published debates of the conventions-prolifer-
ated at that time. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: Tim STATE CONST=TU-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE 1820s (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966) [hereinafter
DEMOCRACY, LiBERTY, AND PROPERTY]. In fact, only 7 of 59 published debates of nine-
teenth century constitutional conventions were for conventions that took place in the 1820s
and 1830s, including Massachusetts (1820), New York (1821), Virginia (1829-1830), Dela-
ware (1831), Michigan (1835), North Carolina (1835), and Pennsylvania (1837).
From the 1840s through the 1860s the debates for 35 conventions were published,
usually increasing in sophistication of stenographic accuracy. Seventeen debates were pub-
lished for conventions that met during the 1870s until the end of the nineteenth century,
but what they lacked in numbers they gained in length, as, for example the 12 volumes of
Missouri's 1875 convention and the 5 volumes of Delaware's 1896-1897 convention.
The focus on state constitution-makers offers a unique means of tracing not only the
results of American constitution-making, but attitudes towards the process of constitu-
tional revision. In most conventions, delegates engaged in a wide range of substantive
debates that reflected political partisanship. Nonetheless, the process of drafting or revis-
ing constitutions inevitably raised questions about the philosophical dimensions and mean-
ing of American constitutionalism. Although not entirely free from various political
agendas, delegates frequently discussed how and why constitutions should be framed and
revised in terms that reflected divergent constitutional persuasions shaped by differing per-
ceptions and understandings of popular sovereignty.
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on differences over how the people could create and change their
written constitutions. The groundwork for distinctive, competing tra-
ditions of constitutionalism was well established by the early national
period. Branded as revolutionists after the Dorr Rebellion and as se-
cessionists after the Civil War, a significant number of delegates kept
alive a constitutional tradition that had emerged with the American
Revolution. They maintained the inherent right of the people to re-
vise, insisted on the existence of a constitutional middle ground be-
tween revolution and procedurally driven constitutional revision, and
persisted in trying to enshrine such guarantees in the constitutions
they drafted or revised.
I. Popular Sovereignty as the Basis of Constitutional Law
With the Declaration of Independence, Americans took an irrev-
ocable step in embracing popular sovereignty. The principle that all
political power derived from the people became indispensable to the
creation of republican governments through written constitutions.
The centrality of popular sovereignty was the acknowledgement that
the people provided the source of authority that made constitutions
fundamental. Constitutions could limit and control government be-
cause they expressed the will of the people in their sovereign, primary
capacity. As such, constitutional law took clear precedence over stat-
utes passed by legislatures functioning in their ordinary capacity a%
representatives of the people. This distinction between constitutional
and ordinary law formed the basis of American constitutionalism.
The hallmarks of that constitutionalism were identifying the people as
the only legitimate basis of government and translating that theory
into a practice of constitution-making.
The procedures and mechanisms used to create and revise consti-
tutions, however, are often confused with popular sovereignty as the
basis of constitutional law. The source of constitutions-the will of
the sovereign people-and not the manner in which they were created
endowed them with their fundamental authority. Eventually, spe-
cially elected conventions were routinely used to frame constitutions,
accompanied by an increased reliance on popular ratification. A mod-
3. The creation of American "states" implicated the notion of sovereignty in two
different senses. The process entailed both a territorial dimension, that is, the state's juris-
diction over a particular region, and a political dimension, that is, the creation of a legiti-
mate government. However, "[t]he revolutionary right to create new governments was a
political right. It could not, without totally upsetting property relations, bring with it a
right to land or territory. Territorial jurisdiction, like property itself, rested on a title."
PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 40 (1983).
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ern assumption that orthodox constitution-making exclusively entails
constitutional conventions followed by ratification has led to a mis-
characterization of early American constitutions. Moreover, it has
overlooked the vitality of the principle of popular sovereignty in con-
stitutional discourse.
In the midst of struggling to define their republican government
and societies, Americans easily agreed on the underlying premise of
popular sovereignty. Accepting popular sovereignty, however, did not
insure agreement on a series of questions having profound conse-
quences for constitution-making and revision. Indeed, the American
Revolution initiated a debate over the implications of popular sover-
eignty that continued throughout the nineteenth century. That debate
proved persistent because popular sovereignty easily lent itself to a
variety of interpretations. It could be seen as a principle inviting prac-
tical invocation and expansively giving the people an active and direct
role in their governments. On the other hand, it could be regarded as
merely the theory underlying American governments that envisioned
a more constrained and passive role for the people. These conflicting
views reflected a struggle over what claims the people had on their
constitutions and what power they had to shape a constitutional tradi-
tion that ultimately rested on their authority. Beneath these differ-
ences lay the relative faith one placed in the capacity of the people to
pursue their best interests. The tensions between these opposing
views were not resolved when the Federal Constitution incorporated a
more passive understanding of popular sovereignty. Beyond the role
of popular sovereignty in constitutional theory, various approaches to
popular sovereignty proved useful in the political debates over sub-
stantive issues in state constitutional conventions. Thus, both theoret-
ical malleability and practical politics helped keep the debate over the
implications of popular sovereignty alive throughout the nineteenth
century.
The Federal Constitution did not epitomize the natural evolution
and mature understanding of American constitution-making since the
Revolution. Rather, it only represented an important eighteenth cen-
tury victory for those who adhered to a narrower view of popular sov-
ereignty that sought to minimize the people's role by channeling their
impact through procedures and the legislative process. Likewise, judi-
cial review was not inevitable, but consistent with an effort to narrow
the implications of popular sovereignty. The context and process of
constitution-making both before and after 1787 reveals the continuing
development of more expansive views of the principle of popular soy-
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ereignty, including the rejection of a judicial monopoly on constitu-
tional interpretation. The ongoing debate over popular sovereignty
compels us to reconsider the inevitability and orthodoxy of what the
Federal Framers produced.
An alternative constitutional view of popular sovereignty has also
been obscured by the tendency to consider the principle primarily as it
relates to the Federal Constitution. The great struggle over the shape
of the national government and its relationship to the states was but
one important battle over the meaning of popular sovereignty. In suc-
cessfully asserting that the theoretical basis of the Federal Constitu-
tion rested on an "unmediated relationship" between the national
government and all American citizens, the authors of The Federalist
advanced an understanding of popular sovereignty that held enor-
mous consequences. 4 Not only did their version of popular sover-
eignty render the sovereign people an arguably impotent "ghostly
body politic,"5 it also justified the suppression of secession.6
The predominant focus on popular sovereignty as it has shaped
the federal government has largely overlooked the principle as it has
been regarded within the context of state constitution-making. Irre-
spective of the arguments of Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and the
outcome of their struggle, popular sovereignty had a related, but ulti-
mately independent meaning at the state level. Both the outcomes
and arguments over what role the people played in constitution-mak-
ing and revision varied from the better known debates captured at the
national level. In the end, both the federal and state constitutions re-
alized the necessity of implementing popular sovereignty.
What revolutionaries said and did reflected their widespread be-
lief that a sovereign people formed the only legitimate basis for gov-
ernments. Subsequent generations of Americans, not to mention
constitutional theorists, have continued to endorse this belief almost
without exception.7 This consensus, however, naturally raised such
4. See Joshua Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic The Federalist Papers and Popular
Sovereignty, 16 POL. THEORY 99, 113 (1988).
5. Id.
6. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, 65 J. AM. HisT. 5
(1978). Alternative views of popular sovereignty as the basis of the Federal Constitution
suffered by their connection with states' rights arguments in defense of slavery.
7. Despite the debate over the origins and nature of the American Revolution and
the Federal Constitution, revisionism has "not undermined in any important way the or-
thodox view that the United States government derives its legitimacy, in the Lockean
sense, from the consent of the governed." James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and
Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PrrT.
L. REv. 189, 193 (1990); see also MARiSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONIFDERAm CONSTrr-
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questions as: How do we make a constitution based on popular sover-
eignty? Who were the people? How could constitutional change oc-
cur? And, are there limits to constitutional revision? The
implications of popular sovereignty in terms of how constitutions
should be created and the people's role in that process were initially
addressed by the revolutionary generation. The issues of future revi-
sion and constitutional change began to receive attention soon there-
after, when the first constitutions were created in 1776 and 1777.
In basing their governments on the people, the American revolu-
tionaries embraced ideas which necessarily rejected the authority of
the King and the British Parliament. Invoking these ideas to effect
revolution proved easier than restraining them after revolutionary
success. Popular sovereignty, according to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, entitled the people to make their own governments and "to
alter or to abolish" them whenever governments become destructive
of their rightful ends.8 This right would endanger the stability of new
governments established under the authority of popular sovereignty if
TION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 7 (1991); DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING
SOUTH 1 (1989); DONALD S. LuTz, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 38 (1980); Akhil Amar, Phila-
delphia Revisited. Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1043,
1054-55 (1988); Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James Madison
Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 2443, 2444
(1990). Even a critic who repudiates Amar's theory and calls popular sovereignty an "eso-
teric notion that is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation" ultimately concedes it to be
"a premise of our beliefs" and "an idea that underlies the constitution." David R. Dow,
When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REv. 1,
26, 35 (1990).
The exception to this consensus occurred late in the nineteenth century and accompa-
nied the Progressive era. One of the few repudiations of popular sovereignty and the ne-
cessity of the people's consent comes from the late nineteenth century commentator
Christopher iedeman at a time when opponents of an expansive view of popular sover-
eignty were fixated on the dangers of anarchy and socialism. See CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115-24 (New
York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890). Bruce N. Ong argues that while popular sovereignty
clearly formed the basis of American constitutions framed in the eighteenth century, in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century it came under attack by Progressives as
the true theory of government. Woodrow Wilson, one of the leading Progressives, "at-
tacked the idea of popular sovereignty as it applied to the constituent act of establishing a
fundamental law" and "sought to replace that notion of sovereignty with one which em-
phasized the sovereignty of those who led the state, not those who ratified its charter of
power and limitations." Bruce N. Ong, Constitutionalism and Political Change: James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Progressive Reinterpretations 333, 339 (1985) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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the people were frequently to resort to their power to make constitu-
tional change. How this underlying power might be exercised long
remained an open question.
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence asserted the American
people's right of revolution in rejecting their political allegiance to
Britain. When Jefferson described the people's right "to alter or to
abolish" governments, observers from his day to our own have linked
his words to natural law. After all, Jefferson had spoken of "inaliena-
ble" rights before identifying the source of government's power as
"the consent of the governed," which allowed the people to overthrow
oppressive regimes.9 Moreover, Jefferson's formulation of the right of
revolution embraced the Lockean justifications for England's Glori-
ous Revolution of 1688.10 Central to John Locke's theory of such a
right was a distinction between "constituent" and "ordinary" sover-
eignty, with the right of the people to act on their supreme, constitu-
ent power limited to the situation of government's dissolution." Even
the most conservative eighteenth century thinkers agreed that the
people had a natural right to revolution in the face of "oppressions"
that "threaten desolation to a state." 2 As political scientist Julie Mos-
tov has observed, if such a theory "provided a way of limiting the arbi-
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
10. See infra note 192.
11. See JULIE MOSTOV, POWER, PROCESS, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 55-60 (1992).
Mostov describes Locke's position as follows: "When the King puts himself in a state of
war with the community, acting 'beyond right,' he loses the immunity and authority given
to him by law. The government dissolves, authority reverts back to the people, and they
then are free to establish a new government." Id. at 59; see also PAUL K. CONKIN, SELF-
EVIDENT TRUTHS: BEING A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT-POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, NATURAL
RIGHTS, AND BALANCE AND SEPARATION OF PowERS 22-23 (1974); Richard Buel, Jr., De-
mocracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 165,
168-176 (1964).
12. GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN Gov-
ERNMENT 12-13 (1970) [hereinafter STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON] (quoting William
Blackstone); see also generally Gerald Stourzh, William Blackstone: Teacher of Revolution,
15 JAHRBUCH FUR AMERIKASTUDIEN 184 (1979).
In 1775, Alexander Hamilton explicitly embraced the people's natural law-based right
of revolution:
When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the rights of a whole
people are invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded.
Men may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and, if they but conform
their actions, to that standard, all cavils against them, betray either ignorance or
dishonesty. There are some events in society, to which human laws cannot ex-
tend; but when applied to them lose all their force and efficacy. In short, when
human laws contradict or discountenance the means, which are necessary to pre-
serve the essential rights of any society, they defeat the proper end of all laws,
and so become null and void.
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trary power of the government, it also offered a way of preventing
popular consent from becoming too direct or overt."'1 3 Such an under-
standing came to characterize the basis of the Federal Constitution.
Equating the people's inherent right to alter or abolish government
with a right of revolution, however, has obscured the development of
American attitudes towards popular sovereignty for constitutional
change.
Although the Declaration of Independence provided the most
important initial formulation of popular sovereignty and the inherent
right of the people to revise government, it did not become the inevi-
table model for state bills of rights of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In fact, the language describing the people's inherent right
under popular sovereignty underwent subtle, but significant changes.
From the Declaration's description of that right as the last-ditch effort
of an oppressed people, state variations increasingly implied that pop-
ular sovereignty gave the people a right of constitutional revision
available long before the development of circumstances justifying
revolution.14 Even though Jefferson alluded to altering government,
the fact remained that revolution followed the Declaration.
In state constitution-making, and particularly as the first state
constitutions were replaced and revised, the focus shifted to the peo-
ple's right to make constitutional modifications. As it became increas-
ingly clear that the practice of constitutional change did not
precipitate revolution, the scope of legitimate revision widened.
Although virtually no one denied the ultimate right of revolution,
some efforts were made to describe popular sovereignty in terms that
implied dire circumstances as a pre-condition to revising the funda-
mental law of a state.'" Despite such attempts, by the 1820s the trend
in state constitutions was to include statements of popular sovereignty
that implied a constitutional right to revise governments in lieu of a
natural law right of revolution.
In implementing popular sovereignty, Americans had departed in
revolutionary ways from traditional understandings of government.
Conceding that sovereignty rested with the people forced a novel view
of constitutions. Popular sovereignty meant that a constitution could
"no longer be regarded as it still was in England, as a contract or
1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 136 (Harold C. Syrett, & Jacob E. Cooke eds.,
1961-1987).
13. MosTov, supra note 11, at 59; see also, EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGN-Y iN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 49-50 (1988).
14. See infra Part IV.D.
15. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
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agreement between two hostile parties, between rulers and people." 16
Rather, in America "the people created constitutions and govern-
ments. '17 James Wilson would later describe constitution-making as
an act of the people themselves and constitutions "as clay in the hands
of a potter," giving the people "the right to mould, to preserve, to
improve, to refine, and to finish it as they please."18 Thus, determin-
ing the people's role became crucial.19 Popular sovereignty implied
that the people might "dissolve political society into its individual,
constituent atoms, if they chose, and make their governments
anew."' 20 These possibilities gave the debate a "radical edge."' 21 They
contributed to an expansionist vision of popular sovereignty that justi-
fied the people as a continuous, direct force for change.
At the same time, other views of popular sovereignty emphasized
its theoretical aspects. The passive view of popular sovereignty simply
justified government as such and regarded popular sovereignty as the
underlying principle that gave American governments their distinctive
republican character. The theory behind republican governments dis-
tinguished non-republican forms, such as monarchies or aristocracies.
While identifying the people as the theoretical basis of republican gov-
ernment, this approach concentrated on the institutional arrange-
ments and limited the people to indirect participation.
The struggle over characterizing popular sovereignty proved con-
fusing and long-lasting because both sides could and did lay claim to a
legitimate understanding of the principle. While disagreeing over its
16. Gordon S. Wood, The Political Ideology of the Founders, in TOWARD A MORE
PERFECr UNION: Six ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 7,23 (Neil L. York ed., 1988). For the
novelty of the idea of "enacted" constitutions, see Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwrit-
ten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv.
843, 864 (1978).
17. Wood, supra note 16, at 23.
18. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 304 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967), quoted in
Gordon S. Wood, Forward. State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 911, 918 (1993).
19. The profound consequences of defining the reach of popular sovereignty were
quickly evident to some revolutionaries. John Adams, for example, worried in 1776 about
constitution-making in the wake of rejecting the British monarchy: American agreement
that "'the consent of the people' provided "'the only moral foundation"' for government
still left untouched the issue of "'to what extent' the principle would be activated. WILL
PAUL ADAMS, THE FiRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 26 (Rita Kimber &
Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (quoting John Adams).
20. DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYwORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINcE INDEPENDENCE 112 (1987).
21. Id.; see also ONUF, supra note 3, at 175; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 319-28 (1969).
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meaning, their shared commitment to popular sovereignty trapped
them on common ground. Sharing this basic assumption about the
basis of American republics guaranteed that the debate would remain
vital, even if inconclusive.
The process of defining the extent of popular sovereignty has
been described as a "struggle with words" known "to be treacherously
unstable and yet too vitally needed simply to abandon."22 Ultimately,
the tensions between these competing visions of popular sovereignty
extended beyond the revolutionary period. They surfaced in the wide
range of contexts in which state constitution-making and revision oc-
curred during the nineteenth century. An exploration of these arenas
permits an analysis of important differences in understanding constitu-
tions and the implications of popular sovereignty. Indeed, defining
the slippery term "popular sovereignty" proved central to the contest
over the meaning of American constitutionalism and the development
of a tradition of constitution-making during the nineteenth century.
The early experience with constitution-making and its products
suggests the persistence of an expansive view of popular sovereignty.
Evidence of an active view of popular sovereignty is found in the text
of the early bills of rights and constitutions. 23 The language used to
describe the principle of popular sovereignty, the inherent right of the
people to effect constitutional revision, and the articulated necessity
of a "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles" illustrated the
activist view. Additionally, the early constitution-makers distin-
guished between ordinary and constitutional law even as they created
constitutions through means other than conventions.24 Finally, the
very absence of procedures for future revision or amendment in many
of the earliest constitutions implied, for many, an assumption that the
people retained an inherent right of revision.25
The first documents produced by constitution-makers and their
experience with those constitutions also reveal the initial, formal ex-
pressions of a constitutional middle ground-a central tenet of what
became an expansive understanding of popular sovereignty. This mid-
dle ground posited that the people possessed an inherent, legitimate
right to change their governments and constitutions without relying on
either the natural law-based right of revolution or the specified proce-
dures for constitutional revision. Opponents of a middle ground in-
22. RODGERS, supra note 20, at 109.
23. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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sisted that such action could only be justified by the raw power any
people had to act in defiance of established rules. Defenders of a mid-
dle ground claimed it as a right uniquely available to Americans.26
Having governments grounded on popular sovereignty distinguished
them from all other "peoples" in the world who could only fall back
on the right of revolution. The absence of such a tradition of a consti-
tutional middle ground in terms of the Federal Constitution has made
it difficult to see its existence at all.2 7
H. The Challenge of Republicanism
Even with a consensus on popular sovereignty as the foundation
of future American governments after the Revolution, Americans dis-
puted the meaning of republicanism. Forty years after independence,
Thomas Jefferson aptly captured the controversy by recalling, "we
imagined every thing republican which was not monarchy."2 Such a
definition accommodated a wide spectrum of conflicting views.
Reaching agreement on republicanism became nearly impossible in
view of the assumption that a single legacy of the Revolution and au-
thentic expression of republicanism existed. 9 Jefferson, no less than
his political rivals and others who joined in the debate, repeatedly
claimed a monopoly on views that were faithful to the spirit of the
revolution.
In some respects, the Revolution was a culmination of popular
sovereignty. It marked the transformation of ideas that replaced king-
ship with government based on the people. Mainly, however, the
26. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
27. See PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC,
LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 225-32 (1990); Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of
American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional
Change, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 1473, 1477, 1496 (1987); Dow, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 4,
at 99, 107; James W. Torke, Assessing The Ackerman and Amar Theses: Notes on Extratex-
tual Constitutional Change, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229 (1994); Thomas R. White, Amend-
ment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1132, 1139 (1952); Note, State
Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. REv. 995, 1005 (1968).
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE
WoRKs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37 (Paul L. Ford, ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-1899).
29. See STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 38-75; Robert E.
Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republi-
canism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49,72 (1972) (stating that repub-
licanism produced "a consensus that promoted discord rather than harmony"). For an
example of how revolutionaries were able to monopolize an understanding of what the
Revolution and republicanism required in Pennsylvania, see Richard Alan Ryerson, Re-
publican Theory and Partisan Reality in Revolutionary Pennsylvania: Toward a New View of
the Constitutionalist Party, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 114-16
(Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1981).
Winter 1997] POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 299
Revolution posed the challenge of republicanism, namely, the need to
examine and reform institutions and behavior and measure them
against a republican yardstick. This stemmed in part from a religious
and moral dimension of the Revolution that entailed more than a
change in forms of government." But it also drew strength from the
widespread belief that republican governments precariously rested on
preserving the public and private virtue of the people and their lead-
ers. As John Adams explained several months before the Declaration
of Independence, "'[p]ublic virtue cannot exist in a Nation without
Private, and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics."' 3
Thus, almost from the start of the Revolution, self-scrutiny focused on
how a republican people waged war and then on how they were to
organize their governments and societies.32
The process of forming republican governments and defining re-
publicanism was complicated by the liberating effects of the Revolu-
tion itself. In the course of their struggle for independence,
Americans had employed a wide range of ad hoc committees, extra-
legal conventions, and even mobs to advance their constitutional posi-
tion.33 The effect of politics "out-of-doors," the active political partici-
30. See, e.g., RUTH H. BLOCH, VISIONARY REPUBLIC: MILLENNIAL THEMES IN AMERI-
CAN THOUGHT, 1756-1800 (1985); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Chris-
tianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9
(1987). As Gordon Wood has put it, republicanism for Americans "added a moral dimen-
sion, a utopian depth, to the political separation from England-a depth that involved the
very character of their society." WOOD, supra note 21, at 47.
31. DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSO-
NIAN AMERICA 69 (1980) (quoting John Adams); see also WOOD, supra note 21, at 65-70.
32. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORA-
TION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 85 (1983); JAMES H.
KEITNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 173-247 (1978);
CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND
AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783, at 3-53 (1979); Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the
Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Nonetheless, Americans tended to avoid controversial issues, such as the nature of
American federalism, during the war years. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF
NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 158-
76 (1979).
33. See DAVID AMMERMAN, IN THE COMMON CAUSE: AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE
COERCIVE ACrs OF 1774 (1974); Lurz, supra note 7, at 78; John Phillip Reid, In a Defen-
sive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, The Justification in Law, and the Coming of the American
Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043 (1974). For contemporary appreciation of the revolu-
tionary potential of popular sovereignty, see ADAMS, supra note 19, at 129, 147-49; JACK-
SON T. MAIN, THE UPPER HOUSE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1763-1788, at 99-243
(1967); J. KIRBY MARTIN, MEN IN REBELLION: HIGHER GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND THE
COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1973); Matthew J. Herrington, Popular Sover-
eignty in Pennsylvania, 1776-1791, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 576 (1994); Edmund S. Morgan,
The Problem of Popular Sovereignty, in AsPEcts OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 107, 111 (1977).
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pation by many who in ordinary times might be expected to defer to
their "betters," and the repeated declaration that all power stemmed
from the people produced a heady atmosphere.34 The populist as-
pects of the revolutionary struggle were undeniable. They excited
some and worried others.35 Most American revolutionaries drew a
distinction between popularly based yet stable republican govern-
ments and dangerously unstable democracies. 36 Still, the challenge re-
mained to enable both political participation by the people and
representation consistent with republicanism.
That challenge surfaced immediately once the people started to
participate in government through elected representatives. Even
before the Revolution, colonial Americans had wondered how to dis-
cover the people's will, express that will, render government respon-
sive to it, and balance popular opinion against the public interest.37
The Revolution, however, intensified interest in these questions by
fully embracing the principle of popular sovereignty. After 1776, a
key question became how to manifest the premise of governments
founded on the will of the people. Inherent in the question of repre-
sentation were tensions between a tradition that stressed deference to
34. See ELISHA P. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOCRATS: TiE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1955);
GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34 (1979); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); Joyce Appleby, The Radical Recrea-
tion of the American Republic, 51 WM. & MARY Q. 679 (1994); Merrill Jensen, The Ameri-
can People and the American Revolution, 57 J. AM. HIST. 5 (1970); Jackson T. Main,
Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legis-
latures, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 391 (1966).
35. For the dismay that some colonial elites felt about sharing power with humbler
sorts after the Revolution, see Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive
Power in the Founding Decade, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 49 (1988).
See also PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 3-26 (1972);
MORGAN, supra note 13, at 257-58; Pauline Maier, Popular Uprising and Civil Authority in
Eighteenth Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1970). As early as 1776, George
Washington worried about the prospects of popular government given the fact that, "'[t]he
few.., who act upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more
than a drop in the Ocean."' Martin S. Flaherty, History 'Lite' in Modern American Consti-
tutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 578 (1995) (quoting Letter from George Washington
to John Hancock (Sept. 24, 1776)).
36. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTTrrTON
65 (1972); WOOD, supra note 21, at 222-23.
37. In historian Carl Becker's classic phrase, the American Revolution produced a
political struggle over "home rule" as well as "who should rule at home." CARL L.
BECKER, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK, 1760-
1776, at 22 (1909).
Winter 1997] POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM .301
political leadership composed of natural elites and emerging notions
of egalitarianism.
The issue of leadership became especially important given the
lurking question of majoritarianism and the potential tyranny of the
many over the few. Constitutions and their bills of rights partly re-
flected an attempt to address some of the concerns for safeguarding
vested property rights and social stability. However, just who "the
people" were, who could elect leaders, and what limits might be im-
posed on the people remained unsettled. Over time, some argued that
the people constituted the majority of the voters and that their will
deserved predominant expression.38 Others strongly opposed majori-
tarianism and sought governmental stability "by balancing the supe-
rior talents of the few against the numerical strength of the many. '39
Discussing the proper means and basis of representation, of course,
drew upon English and colonial antecedents, but the Revolution
forced Americans to revisit these issues through the lens of
republicanism.
Exploration of the people's political participation in republics
emerged as the colonies established their first state constitutions. His-
torian Edmund Morgan has observed the growing recognition that
popular sovereignty had a volatile potential in terms of the people's
political participation.40 Some sought to tame popular sovereignty by
establishing its practice and meaning so "as not to threaten the gov-
ernment of the few on the one hand or the rights of the many on the
other."'4 1 The challenge consisted of giving popular sovereignty "a
close enough resemblance to fact to permit the willing suspension of
disbelief," but not interpreting it "so literally as to invite subversion
either of the social order or the accompanying political authority it
was designed to support. 42
Similarly, historian Willi Paul Adams has identified the existence
of a "minority" after the Revolution that was unsatisfied with "the
mere recognition of popular sovereignty as a principle" and who "de-
manded that the principle be put into practice more and more exten-
sively by increasing the number of those who would control
38. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
39. Appleby, supra note 1, at 801; see also DAVID H. FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN THE ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DE-
MOCRACY (1965); David H. Fischer, The Myth of the Essex Junto, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 191,
199-213 (1964).
40. MORGAN, supra note 13, at 136.
41. Id at 151.
42. Id.
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government power. '43 Such "willingness to realize popular sover-
eignty fully, or at least to a greater degree than it had been realized in
the past, became the criterion for political radicalism." 44 Penn-
sylvania's "radical" 1776 Constitution arguably marked the "outer
limits of the Revolution" by its thoroughgoing incorporation of de-
mocracy.45 Most Americans, however, favored a representative gov-
ernment that would control numerical majorities of the people. Thus,
Adams identifies a split between those who differentiated between
"the source of legitimate power... rightly in the people, and the ac-
tual seat of that power.., held by those who govern" and those seek-
ing representative equality to prevent "interest groups" from
undermining "the exercise of government for the good of the major-
ity."' 46 Both positions were compatible with "republicanism." A deci-
sion remained as to which understanding of popular sovereignty ought
to shape government.47
The urgency of this initial dispute remained an underlying dy-
namic in the debates over popular sovereignty, namely, that the
source that legitimized governments-the people-constantly re-
mained as a potential power superior to the existence and operation
of government itself. How the people could exercise that power-
strictly in accordance with existing procedures, only through their
elective representatives, or in some more direct, primary invocation of
their sovereignty without such constraints or authorization-became
one of the great issues that constitution-makers wrestled with in the
nineteenth century. Indeed, historian Joyce Appleby has observed
that the radicalism generated by the American Revolution "was more
liberating than the simple democratization of elite social relations,
more intellectual than the benign affirmation of civic virtue by classi-
43. ADAMS, supra note 19, at 147.
44. Id. at 148.
45. Ryerson, supra note 29, at 96, 132-33; see also Robert F. Williams, The State Con-
stitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influ-
ences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 541, 554-58 (1989).
46. ADAMS, supra note 19, at 148.
47. Willi Paul Adams suggests that the "minority" wanting a fuller recognition of pop-
ular sovereignty was not committed to democratic government. Rather, their statements
could simply have reflected a belief that popular sovereignty had practical consequences
and was not merely the theoretical principle underlying American governments. Such a
radical or minority view of popular sovereignty was consistent with the notion of delegated
power under republican (as opposed to democratic) governments, but it insisted on recog-
nition of the inherent right of the people to alter their governments as constitutionally
legitimate. See id. at 147-49.
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cal republicans, and more revolutionary than a war for
independence."'
If the war raised questions about the nature of representation,
political activity from 1776 to 1787 affected many Americans' percep-
tions of representative government. Well known are the excesses and
"vices" James Madison saw in American government, largely shaped
by his personal observations as a member of the Virginia Legisla-
ture.4 9 Even more attention, both within and without Pennsylvania,
was paid to that state's experience under its first constitution, which
by 1789 Benjamin Rush characterized as a "'mobocracy."' 50 How-
ever, many others besides Madison and Rush were distressed by pop-
ular government in the state assemblies after the war. They intended
to "subdue the unthinking many to the thoughtful few, to curb the
local prejudice of representatives and give a more cosmopolitan com-
position to their assemblies."'" Their concerns promoted the convic-
tion that while the people formed the source of political legitimacy,
their involvement should be less direct, freeing representation from
popular pressure, and hopefully resulting in leadership by a virtuous
elite.52 Such attitudes clearly favored a narrower formulation of pop-
ular sovereignty and found expression in the Federal Constitution.
48. Appleby, supra note 34, at 683 (criticizing Gordon S. Wood's The Radicalism of the
American Revolution for discounting the theoretical and philosophical dimensions of the
nascent democracy in the Revolution that would ultimately overthrow republicanism).
49. See JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1962-1991); see also Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the
Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215, 215-35
(1979). With a new Federal Constitution, Madison hoped to "redeem the honor of the
Republican name." Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 24, 1787), in 9
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 294, 295.
For the way in which many contemporaries perceived the post-revolutionary years as a
"critical period," see ONuF, supra note 3, at 149-85.
50. David F. Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution 178 (1961) (quoting Letter from
Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Jan. 22, 1789)).
For the galvanizing effect of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution on early state constitu-
tion-makers and the Federal Framers, see Williams, supra note 45, at 561-78.
51. MORGAN, supra note 13, at 255; see also STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
note 12, at 51; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EvE OF DISUNION 21-23 (1984); Appleby, supra
note 1, at 801.
52. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 108-09
(1988); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 16 (1992); MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY:
CONSTrUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN AMERICAN CULTURE 24-25 (1988); LUTZ, supra note 7, at
22; MORGAN, supra note 13, at 255; J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 169-382 (1966); WIEBE, supra note 69, at
38-39; Joyce Appleby, Capitalism, Liberalism, and the United States Constitution, in THE
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Even if the Federal Constitution represented a "presumption that the
people should be seen and not heard," democratic-republican socie-
ties continued to stress "the need for extensive popular participation
in the governmental process. 53
1I. Competing Constitutional Visions: A Detailed Look at
the State Sources
The period between 1776 and 1787 is commonly considered to be
a crucial time in American history, in which changing conceptions of
popular sovereignty, government, and constitutions were largely in-
corporated into the Federal Constitution. This focus on the revolu-
tionary era has distorted our understanding of American constitution-
making. Much of the scholarly work on the period 1776-1787 has ex-
amined the ideology behind the American Revolution and the philo-
sophical basis of the Federal Constitution.54 As important as these
questions are, they have led to erroneous assumptions and have over-
looked the significance of the debate over the implications of popular
sovereignty in American history.
The principal erroneous assumption represents this time as the
critical occasion for the development of attitudes towards American
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 61, 64-66 (A.E.
Dick Howard ed., 1992); Buel, supra note 11, at 177-90; Wood, supra note 16, at 9-24.
Barbara Smith notes that founding the Revolution on "We the people" ironically facil-
itated the tendency between 1776 and the 1780s of controlling the forces unleashed by the
Revolution: "That revolutionary fact provided a rationale for suppressing crowds, chan-
neling participation into the process of the vote, and closing down available terrain outside
that chosen form." Barbara C. Smith, Food Riots and the American Revolution, 51 WM. &
MARY Q. 3, 34 (1994). In 1804, on the day before his ill-fated duel, Alexander Hamilton
epitomized concerns over the direct involvement of the people by characterizing Democ-
racy as America's "real Disease" and "poison." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Theo-
dore Sedgwick (July 10, 1804), in 26 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
12, at 309.
53. PHILLIP S. FONER, THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A Doc.
UMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLU-
TIONS, AND TOASTS 40 (1976). Significantly, the strongest charge against democratic-
republican societies was, in the words of condemnation used by George Washington, their
"self-created" nature that undermined lawful authority and invoked extra-constitutional
power. See id. at 31; see also id. at 24-40; RUSSELL L. HANSON, THE DEMOCRATIC IMAGI-
NATION IN AMERICA: CONVERSATIONS WITH OUR PAST 83-88 (1985).
54. The literature is enormous. Two of the most influential studies that have shaped
modem scholarship, however, are BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUrION (1967), and WOOD, supra note 21. For assessments of the influ-
ence of Wood's Creation of the American Republic on our understanding of American
constitutional history, see The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Sympo-
sium of Views and Reviews, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 549 (1987), and Flaherty, supra note 35, at
523-90.
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constitution-making.55 A second, related erroneous assumption con-
siders the Federal Constitution the matured understanding of how to
frame constitutions.5 6 Both the duration and content of the debate
over the implications of popular sovereignty challenge these assump-
tions. The eighteenth century marked the beginning-not the end-
of how Americans approached the task of creating written constitu-
tions.57 Moreover, an examination of constitution-making from the
55. This assumption underlies Gordon Wood's argument that while Americans experi-
mented with radical constitutional arrangements after the Revolution, they rejected such
understandings relatively soon and invented "a new science of politics" that culminated in
the Federal Constitution. See WOOD, supra note 21; see also CONKIN, supra note 11, at 177
(finding that, between 1776 and 1789, "popular sovereignty matured in America into en-
during institutions"); JAMES WILLARD HURST, Tim GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
LAW MAKERS 224 (1950) (stating that the time of the formation and ratification of the
Federal Constitution was the "classic" period in American constitution-making); KAMMEN,
supra note 52, at 104 (stating that 1776 to 1787 marked America's "most creative phase of
constitution-making"); DONALD S. LuTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 5-6 (1988) (stating that the Federal Constitution "represents a kind of historical culmi-
nation" and "the critical expression of the American constitutional tradition"); Bruce
Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475, 572
(1995) (stating that "the Founding" of the Federal Constitution served "as a great prece-
dent in the ongoing practice of popular sovereignty"); Herman J. Belz, Constitutionalism
and the American Founding, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
346 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (stating that the Federal Constitu-
tion "signified climax and fulfillment of the Revolution"); Thad W. Tate, The Social Con-
tract in America, 1774-1787- Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. &
MARY Q. 375, 391 (1965) (finding social contract theory largely constrained by the 1780s);
Wood, supra note 18, at 926 (arguing that basic ideas of American constitutionalism, in-
cluding "the process of popular ratification," were "realized" before the drafting of the
Federal Constitution). Contributing to an exaggerated sense of the importance of the for-
mation of the Federal Constitution on constitutional ideas is the tendency of scholars to
speak in terms of "the Founding" and "the 'Critical Period."' See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note
35, at 527 n.17.
56. See scholarship discussed in Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradi-
tion Revisited. Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth
Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945, 952-62 (1994); see also CONKIN, supra note 11, at 177
(finding that the Federal Constitution "came as close as possible to an emerging majority
view on the best form for a 'republican' government"); Ryerson, supra note 29, at 98 (stat-
ing that the Federal Constitution has been "regarded almost universally by historians as
the quintessential expression of political wisdom of the American people"). Even a cri-
tique of the ahistorical nature of much recent constitutional work essentially equates
"American constitutionalism" with the ideas surrounding the Federal Constitution. See
Flaherty, supra note 35. Moreover, Flaherty concludes that "recent work on the many
steps leading to 1787 contributes to a growing literature that, taken together, views the
Founding as a union of ideological trends rather than the triumph of any one." ld. at 549;
see also id. at 585.
57. For all of their interpretative differences, both Pocock and Wood see the Federal
Constitution as an endpoint. See WOOD, supra note 21, at 606 (arguing that the Federal
Constitution marked "the end of classical politics" in America); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT. FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC RE-
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Revolution through the nineteenth century demonstrates that the
Federal Constitution represented only one approach to constitution-
making, and not an inevitable model.
The intellectual origins of the Revolution and the Federal Consti-
tution are widely explored for their key insights into the American
constitutional experience. Examining these events is important, but it
runs the risk of obscuring an issue that bridged the Revolution and the
Federal Constitution and continued to challenge Americans: the con-
sequences for constitution-making and constitutional revision of bas-
ing government on popular sovereignty.58 Whatever the intellectual
and philosophical background of the Revolution and the Federal Con-
stitution (which is varied, complex, and much disputed by scholars), it
cannot be denied that after 1776 all American constitutions would be
founded on popular sovereignty.5 9 In fact, the constitutions written
after the Revolution-both the Federal Constitution and the state
PUBLICAN TRADITION 462 (1975) (arguing that the Federal Constitution should be re-
garded as the "last act of the civic Renaissance").
58. A number of scholars, while identifying a continuing struggle over popular sover-
eignty, have tended to see it as primarily an issue of political rather than constitutional
debate. See, e.g., HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WicEFK, EQUAL JusrIcE UNDER
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 2 (1982); RODGERS, supra note 20,
80-111.
59. Much contemporary scholarship on the American Revolution and the Federal
Constitution has re-examined a longstanding view that those two events were primarily, if
not exclusively, influenced by the writings of John Locke. Important revisions of this or-
thodox explanation have included the following: the identification of a civic republicanism
as having its roots in the ideas of Aristotle and other classical philosophers as elaborated
by later thinkers, especially Niccolo Machiavelli and James Harrington; an exploration of
the influence of numerous philosophers of the Enlightenment era besides Locke; attention
to the influence of Christian thought-especially biblical notions of covenant in Puritan
and Calvinist thought; and the colonial experiences with self-government. For a brief over-
view of this revisionist scholarship, see Gardner, supra note 7, at 189, 192-96. Republican-
ism, especially, has generated an enormous amount of attention and controversy over its
content and role in interpreting American history. See, e.g., THE REPUBLICAN SYNTrHESIS
REvIsrrED (Milton M. Klein et al. eds., 1992); Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical
Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 39 (1989); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republi-
canism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIsT. 11 (1992); Shalhope, supra note 29. In
addition, John Phillip Reid has written extensively on how the American Revolution was
rooted in a traditional legal and constitutional context. See JoHN P. REID, 1-4 CONS=rrU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUrION (THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986),
THE AUTHORITY TO TAX (1987), THE AUTHORITY TO LEGIsLATE (1991), Tm AUTHORT
OF LAW (1993)); JOHN P. REID, Tm CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1988).
Another result of the revisionist scholarship on the Revolution and the Federal Con-
stitution has been to call into question the unity of the intellectual context of those two
events. Gordon Wood, most prominently, has argued that 1776 to 1787 marked a dramatic
transformation of ideas, the result of which did not make the Federal Constitution the
logical or natural culmination of the Revolution. See WooD, supra note 21.
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constitutions before and after 1787-clearly linked their legitimacy to
a sovereign people.60
The crucial matter now became one's description and under-
standing of popular sovereignty. The concerns over the populist as-
pects of American government that many shared with James Madison
did not prompt a repudiation of popular sovereignty; rather, they
shaped an expression of popular sovereignty that essentially domesti-
cated and constrained the principle.61 The Federal Constitution re-
flected this passive version of popular sovereignty, but it was not
inevitable. Indeed, a tradition of "activist popular sovereignty" did
not die.62 Constitution-making in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
60. In addition to the fact that the federal and state constitutions served significantly
different functions, popular sovereignty in the federal context served to reconfigure the
conception of the Union and evade the question of whether the states or the Union were
sovereign. See ONuF, supra note 3, at 157, 191, 200, 207. Still, both state and federal
constitutions ultimately rested on the principle that a sovereign people (be they "Ameri-
can" citizens or citizens of individual states) legitimated government. This was Justice Wil-
son's basic point in his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 453 (1793)-
that underneath the jurisdictional struggle between the federal and state governments lay
the fact of a sovereign people that could limit both governments. This was also the same
point-to a different effect-that the Anti-Federalist Luther Martin made when he ob-
jected to the ratification of the Federal Constitution "by the people at large, in their capac-
ity as individuals" because the sovereign people of each state had invested their
sovereignty in their respective state governments. Luther Martin, The Genuine Informa-
tion, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, Relative to the Proceedings of
the General Convention, Held at Philadelphia (1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172, 193 (Max Farrand ed., New Haven, Conn., Yale Univ. Press
1966) (1787) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Martin concluded "that, in a federal government, the
parties to the compact are not the people, as individuals, but the States, as States; and that
it is by the States as States, in their sovereign capacity, that the system of government ought
to be ratified, and not by the people, as individuals." Id. I thank Jim Kettner for bringing
this to my attention.
61. See LUTz, supra note 7, at 41,232-38; MORGAN, supra note 13, at 107-11; MosTov,
supra note 11, at 60-62, 68-69; WOOD, supra note 21, at 519-36; Flaherty, supra note 35, at
523, 547-48; Miller, supra note 4, at 99-119; Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitu-
tion, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITrrION? 1, 12-17 (Robert A. Goldwin & William
A. Schambra eds., 1980).
62. James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 819, 826-31 (1991); see also FONER, supra note 53. Moreover, Martin Fla-
herty, after underscoring Gordon Wood's central "insight that the Federalists in fundamen-
tal ways rejected the republican assumptions especially evident in the first state
constitutions," suggests that this rejection was not "total or final." Flaherty, supra note 35,
at 523, 566.
Many scholars assume that such views were banished to the fringes of respectable
discussions of constitutional ideas. One scholar sees a shift in the emergence of an Ameri-
can constitutional tradition from "revolutionary republicans" to "constitutional republi-
cans" after 1787, with the latter emphasizing a more submissive role for the citizen in
government. Michael Lienesch, The Constitutional Tradition: History, Political Action, and
Progress in American Political Thought, 1787-1793, 42 J. POL. 2 (1980). Pauline Maier
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turies demonstrates the enunciation of a more radical vision and the
persistence of the theoretical legitimacy of such a view. The Federal
Constitution marked only one victory, albeit an important one, for
forces who favored a passive understanding of popular sovereignty.
The American Revolution cemented popular sovereignty as the
foundational principle of government. Indeed, the Declaration of In-
dependence-and most of the American constitutions framed since
that time-explicitly identified the people as the legitimate basis of
government. The Declaration asserted that "just powers" derived
from the consent of the governed and that "the people" could over-
turn unjust governments.63 Similar statements in state constitutions
expressed "the very heart of the consensus among the victors of
1776."1 Indeed, by 1779 "no patriotic American could dispute the
idea that the people were the ultimate source of all political author-
identifies a shift in the theoretical understanding of a right of resistance grounded in the
American revolutionary tradition by the late 1780s, with a greater concern evidenced
about the dangers to liberty posed by the people rather than the executive branches of
government. In this context
it seemed to many that the right of resistance and of revolution had also become
outmoded for Americans, at least in the forms they had taken in the past. Direct
popular action could be no longer exercised legitimately by those who lived under
a constitutional republic, and so could never exhaust the "peaceful means of
redress."
Maier, supra note 1, at 5. Thad Tate's description of the social contract theory in revolu-
tionary America saw its use as largely giving "legitimacy to a revolutionary course of ac-
tion." Tate, supra note 55, at 391. By the 1780s the use of "new procedures for the new
adoption of constitutions demonstrated the tendency of the Revolution to eventuate in
legalistic institutions rather than in a body of revolutionary dogma." Id.; see also ADAMS,
supra note 19, at 138 (describing the "notable" absence of explicit popular sovereignty
statements in the Articles of Confederation and the Federal Constitution); KAHN, supra
note 52, at 16, 18-23; KAMMEN, supra note 52, at 24 (finding that by 1787 "a more conserva-
tive" perception of popular sovereignty had emerged); LuTz, supra note 7, at 22; WIEBE,
supra note 51, at 38-39; WIECEK, supra note 36, at 42; Appleby, supra note 52, at 65; Her-
rington, supra note 33, at 595; Jennifer Nedelsky, Democracy, Justice, and the Multiplicity
of Voices: Alternatives to the Federalist Vision, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 232,240-42 (1989); Harry
L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Consti-
tutional Change of Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 474 (1993).
63. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
64. ADAMS, supra note 19, at 137. According to Edmund Morgan, after the Revolu-
tion Americans established "governments which rested entirely on popular choice," and
the Revolution "produced many new affirmations of the idea" particularly in the state
constitutions that declared that the government "rested wholly on the popular will." Mor-
gan, supra, note 33, at 101.
Although he concludes that the social contract theory became transformed for con-
servative uses, Thad Tate agrees that at its base it contained the inherent principle "that
government should be founded upon and limited by a formal act of popular consent." Tate,
supra note 55, at 381; see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 2444.
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ity."'65 This widespread belief gives force to Jefferson's disclaimers
late in his life that his Declaration of Independence merely reflected
"the common sense of the subject. '66 Jefferson remained a lifelong
advocate for an expansive view of the principle and for the active role
it implied for the people.67
Commitment to popular sovereignty remained, even as doubts in-
creased about the prudence of giving the people a direct role in gov-
ernment. By 1787, many drafters and supporters of the Federal
Constitution equated state politics and constitutions of the 1770s with
"long-feared anarchy" rather than "new-modeled democracy. ' 6 The
recent events of the Shays Rebellion had rekindled fears of anarchy;
to many, like John Marshall, "a deep shade" seemed cast over the
"bright prospect" for free government made possible with the Revolu-
tion.69 By 1787, "the concept of political liberty, arising from broadly
based and ongoing participation, seemed somewhat less attractive
than it had in 1776. 170
65. Barbara C. Smith, The Politics of Price Control in Revolutionary Massachusetts,
1774-1780, at 483 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). Ronald Peters
concludes that drafters of Massachusetts's 1780 Constitution clearly conceived their society
and their constitution as being based on popular sovereignty. See RONALD M. PETERS, JR.,
THE MASSACHUSETrS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT 108 (1978); see also
CONKIN, supra note 11, at 52 (noting the "almost unanimous acceptance of popular sover-
eignty at the level of abstract principle" after the Revolution).
66. Knud Haakonssen, From Natural Law to the Rights of Man: A European Perspec-
tive on American Debates, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSO-
PHY, POLMCS, AND LAW, 1791 AND 1991, at 19, 43 n.54 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud
Haakonssen eds., 1991) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
67. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10
WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 37, 37-45; ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND
MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 62-96 (1964); Charles L. Griswold, Jr., Rights and
Wrongs: Jefferson, Slavery, and Philosophical Quandaries, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS, supra
note 66, at 173-75; Merrill D. Peterson, Mr. Jefferson's 'Sovereignty of the Living Genera-
tion,' 52 VA. Q. REv. 437, 437-47 (1976); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, the Foun-
ders, and Constitutional Change, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE
FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 275 (J. Jackson Barlow et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Peterson, THOMAS JEFFERSON]; Herbert Sloan, "The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to the Liv-
ing," in JEFFERSONTAN LEGACIES 281, 281-315 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993).
68. Appleby, supra note 1, at 802; see also RODGERS, supra note 20, at 63-66; Jensen,
supra note 34, at 5-7, 34-35; Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making
of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 1, at 69.
69. Letter from John Marshall to James Wilkinson (Jan. 5, 1787), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL at 201 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974); see also IN DEBT To
SHAYS: THE BICETENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993);
Robert A. Feer, Shay's Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEw ENG.
Q. 388 (1969); Myron F. Wehje, Boston's Response to Disorder in the Commonwealth,
1783-1787, 12 HIST. J. MASS. 19 (1984).
70. MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, SPHERES OF LIBERTY: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF LIB-
ERTY IN AM-RICAN CULTURE 38 (1986); see also ONUF, supra note 3, at 70, 174-75; ROD-
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Nonetheless, during the federal convention James Madison de-
scribed the people as "the fountain of all power," entitled to "alter
constitutions as they pleased."71 After the convention, supporters of
the Federal Constitution were equally fulsome in their praise of popu-
lar sovereignty, frequently invoking foundational imagery. In The
Federalist No. 49, Madison proclaimed that the people were "the only
legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitu-
tional charter, under which the several branches of government hold
their power, is derived." 72 During the ratification convention for the
Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania, James Wilson argued that sov-
ereignty "resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government. '7 3
Even Alexander Hamilton, no friend of the common man, asserted in
The Federalist No. 22 that "[t]he fabric of American empire ought to
rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE... that
pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority."74 Quite simply, all
Federalists accepted consent and popular sovereignty as the basis of
government, even as they worried about how to ensure the stability of,
and infuse wisdom into, such governments.75
GERS, supra note 20, at 66; Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide":
The State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HAs.
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 403, 425-26 (1988).
71. 2 MAX FARRAND, supra note 60, at 476.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Moreover, Madison in The Federalist No. 43 declared that "[t]he express authority of the
people alone could give due validity to the constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 269
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
73. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention Debate (December 4, 1787), in PENN.
SYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1776-1788, at 316 (John Bach McMaster &
Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Pa., Inquirer Printing & Publ'g Co. 1888). In that same
convention, Wilson observed:
The truth is, that, in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legisla-
tures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in
this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our constitutions
control in act, as well as right.
Id at 230, quoted in Akhil Amar, The Consent of the Governed.- Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. Ray. 457, 474 (1994).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). In addition, Hamilton described "the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness" as the
"fundamental principle" of republicanism. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
75. See KAHN, supra note 52, at 14, 16. Despite crucial differences between Federalist
and Anti-Federalist thought, Jennifer Nedelsky asserts that "all the federalists accepted the
premise that only government by the consent of the governed was legitimate." Nedelsky,
supra note 62, at 234,240-42. On Jefferson's and Madison's shared commitment to popular
sovereignty despite their differences, see Ong, supra note 7, at 112-238.
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Declarations of popular sovereignty hardly abated with the ratifi-
cation of the Federal Constitution. If anything, Americans more fully
elaborated its centrality to American government. In his 1790 Lec-
tures on Law, James Wilson described popular sovereignty as "the vi-
tal principle" of American government that implies "'that the
supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens at
large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing,
altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in
whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient.' '76 Moreover, the
"revolution[ary] principle" that underlay the Federal Constitution was
"not a principle of discord, rancor, or war" but rather "a principle of
melioration, contentment, and peace. '77 Wilson's view of popular
sovereignty, historian Gordon Wood argues, became the basis not
only of federalist thought, but of all American thinking about
government.78
If supporters of the Federal Constitution reiterated popular sov-
ereignty, those with greater reservations about the national govern-
ment also extolled the principle. Thomas Jefferson enshrined popular
sovereignty as the cornerstone of foreign policy when he was Wash-
ington's Secretary of State between 1791 and 1793, calling it "the
Catholic principle of republicanism, to wit, that every people may es-
tablish what form of government they please, and change it as they
The arch-Federalist Fisher Ames illustrated how one could simultaneously accept pop-
ular sovereignty and distrust the people when he addressed the House of Representatives
in 1789: "'We are the servants of the people, we are the watchmen, and we should be
unfaithful in both characters, if we should so administer the Government as to destroy its
great principles and most essential advantages."' John W. Malsberger, The Political
Thought of Fisher Ames, 2 . EARLY REPUBLIC 1, 6 (1982) (quoting Fisher Ames). Ed-
mund Morgan describes how Federalists responded to Patrick Henry's question of why the
Constitution spoke of "We the People" rather than "We the States" as follows: "the con-
vention spoke of'we the People' because it recognized the superiority of the people to the
states." MORGAN, supra note 13, at 281-82; see also SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW
21 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
76. KAMmEN, supra note 52, at 30 (quoting James Wilson). In 1793, John Marshall
described "the people" as "the source of all power." Letter from John Marshall to Augus-
tine Davis (Oct. 16, 1793), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 1775-1788, supra note 69,
at 221.
77. KAHN, supra note 52, at 58.
78. See Wood, supra note 16, at 21-22. There would seem to be evidence that Wilson's
views in taking "literally and seriously the proposition that the absolute sovereignty of the
people is the first principle of republican government" differentiated him from other feder-
alists who embraced a more passive version of popular sovereignty. JENNrFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LiMITs OF AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONALISM 139 (1990); see
generally id. at 96-140.
312 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:287
please. '79 In the state constitutions drafted before 1800, the notion of
"consent" was ever-present.8 ° Indeed, the "political grammar" in
which constitutional issues were discussed from the Revolution
through the 1820s reveals that Americans "across the range of polit-
ical opinion" endorsed popular sovereignty-from "the ultra-nation-
alist" John Jay calling the people "the sovereigns of the country" to
the Anti-Federalist Spenser Roane defining the people as "the only
sovereign power." 81 In 1825, despite Madison's growing concerns
about the government he largely designed, he described the people's
exclusive right to alter constitutions based on popular sovereignty as a
"vital" principle "justly the pride of our popular governments. 8s2
Even Alexis de Tocqueville, who worried in the 1830s that popular
sovereignty might lead to "an enslavement of the mind" by focusing
authority on the people and "majority opinion," conceded that "the
support or acquiescence of the people is required of ali established
institutions. 83
The universal support for popular sovereignty after the Revolu-
tion naturally led to the question of its implementation. Inherently,
the principle possessed both a radical and conservative potential.
From the start, popular sovereignty could be considered a real or the-
oretical principle, and could be described expansively or narrowly.84
Moreover, those different possibilities were not merely present and
acted upon in the period between the Revolution and the Federal
Constitution, but long afterwards as well. A series of issues raised by
the concept of "a sovereign people" produced tensions in resolving
the implications of America's foundational principle.
79. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the Legitimacy of Government, 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 802 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990), quoted in Michael Lienesh, Thomas
Jefferson and the Democratic Experience: The Origins of the Partisan Press, Popular Polit-
ical Parties, and Public Opinion, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES, supra note 67, at 316, 330.
80. Apparently, state constitutions before 1800 mentioned the word "consent" 127
times. See LuTz, supra note 7, at 47, 49; see also Lur-z, supra note 55, at 81-82.
81. H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C.
L. Rnv. 949, 986-87 (1993).
82. Ong, supra note 7, at 117 (quoting Letter from James Madison to George Thomp-
son (June 30, 1825).
83. Robert P. Kraynak, Tocqueville's Constitutionalism, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1175,
1179 (1987).
84. Donald Lutz has noted that popular sovereignty could be understood by state con-
stitution-makers in a variety of ways that cover many different institutional possibilities.
See L=rrz, supra note 7, at 38; see also MosTov, supra note 11, at 64-68 (discussing the
"democratic version" of popular sovereignty advanced by Thomas Jefferson and Thomas
Paine); Smith, supra note 65, at 483 (arguing that if popular sovereignty was "unques-
tioned" in the revolutionary period, it was "far from completely defined and understood").
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In this regard, much of the scholarly concern over whether
Madison and other Framers of the Federal Constitution were true to
the spirit of the Revolution misses the point.85 The Federal Constitu-
tion was less an inevitable model of written constitutions as much as
one important variation that generated a distinct constitutional tradi-
tion. Other views of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism also
existed and molded rather different understandings about constitu-
tion-making and revision.
An expansive view of popular sovereignty initially surfaced
among those who sought a fuller realization of popular sovereignty.
The so-called "radical" Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provides
one early example. This constitution reflected a wider understanding
of the principle, not merely in institutional arrangements, but in how it
described popular sovereignty. When early state constitutions spoke
of the inherent right of the people to change their governments, a
good many people took that language literally.86 As an essayist from
the Federal Gazette put it in 1789: "The PEOPLE, who are the sover-
eigns of the State, possess a power to alter when and in what way they
please. To say otherwise... is to make the thing created, greater than
the power that created it."'8 7 A year later Samuel Adams chided his
cousin John for his moderate description of popular sovereignty: "Is
not the whole sovereignty, my friend, essentially in the people? ... Is
it not the uncontrollable, essential right of the people to amend and
85. Lance Banning asserts that Madison remained true to the principles of the Revolu-
tion, but that by 1787 he worried "that revolutionary governments were so responsive to
the wishes of unhampered, temporary state majorities that they endangered the unalien-
able rights that independence was intended to protect." Lance Banning, 'To Secure these
Rights': Patrick Henry, James Madison, and the Revolutionary Legitimacy of the Constitu-
tion, in To SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION
280, 298 (Sarah Baumgartner Thurow ed., 1988). Thus, Madison only worked to restrain
"tyrannical majorities" but never doubted that "majorities should rule-or that the people
would control the complicated structure raised by the completed constitution." Id. at 301.
The point, however, is not Madison's fidelity to the legacy of the Revolution, but that
his perception of the experiment with republican governments was much less sanguine
than others. Many Anti-Federalists and others did not share Madison's fears and were
consequently willing to accord the people a less constrained participatory role in govern-
ment. See, e.g., HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981);
Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representa-
tive Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1955).
86. Henry Witte asserts that the popular sovereignty clauses in the 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution represented more than "a formal, theoretical basis for government in general,
but a power to be claimed by the people in real time and in real places." Witte, supra note
62, at 390.
87. Herrington, supra note 33, at 577.
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alter, or annul their constitution and frame a new one .... ,"88 Well
before the rise of Jacksonian democracy, indeed, as early as 1797 and
1807, assertions were made about the constitutional legitimacy of
changing government through the people's "primary capacity."8 9
Such views were associated with an understanding of popular sov-
ereignty by some revolutionaries that posited a more direct role for
the people in government.90 That understanding included a right of
resistance located between the extremes of acquiescence and revolu-
tion.91 Such a position supported a belief that the people's inherent
right to revise constitutions under popular sovereignty justified bypas-
sing, if not defying, constitutional procedures for revision without in-
yoking the people's ultimate right of revolution based on natural law.
Americans invoked this right of resistance during the late eighteenth
century and early nineteenth century.9 2 According to historian Pau-
line Maier, the "widespread appeal" of a right of resistance "in the
opening decades of the new nation confirms its cogency to a genera-
tion of Americans fully immersed in the revolutionary and constitu-
tional traditions of the Anglo-American world."'93
The 1820s witnessed many assertions of the inherent right of the
people to justify movements for constitutional revision that circum-
vented the legislature or existing procedures for constitutional change.
The most notorious claim of a constitutional middle ground was
88. LUTZ, supra note 7, at 17.
89. MARVIN E. GErTLEMAN, Tr DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADI-
CALISM, 1833-1849, at 11 (1973). In 1818 and 1820 several Rhode Island newspapers as-
serted the people's "undoubted right" to bypass a legislature reluctant to facilitate
constitutional change and in their "sovereign and corporate capacity" to hold conventions
to establish a new constitution. PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE
ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1776-1841, at 186, 188 (1977).
90. See DOUGLASS, supra note 34; LuTz, supra note 7, at 1-22; MAIER, supra note 35,
at 3-26; WOOD, supra note 21, at 306-89; Miller, supra note 4, at 99, 104; Alan D. Watson,
The Public Meeting in Antebellum North Carolina: The Example of Edgecombe County, 64
N.C. HisT. REv. 19, 19-42 (1987).
91. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 138. In 1777, Benjamin Hichborn posited such a
direct authority when he claimed "a power in the people at large, at any time, for any
cause, or for no cause, but their own sovereign pleasure, to alter or annihilate both the
mode and essence of any former government, and adopt a new one in its stead."
STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 56.
92. See, e.g., JAMES M. BANNER, To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS
AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815, at 294-350 (1969);
Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in
Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 145,145-76 (1948);
Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 315, 315-54 (1994); James Morton Smith, The
Grass Roots Origins of the Kentucky Resolutions, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 221, 221-45 (1970).
93. Maier, supra note 1, at 14.
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Rhode Island's Dorr Rebellion in 1842. During that struggle, so-
called Dorrites would invoke the justification of "peaceable revolu-
tion" and infuriate their opponents by asserting a distinction between
a "right of revolution" as opposed to a "right of revolution.'94 They
were met by Daniel Webster's response that "[t]he Constitution does
not proceed on any right of revolution; but does go on the idea that
within and under the Constitution, no new form of government can be
established in any State, without the authority of the existing govern-
ment."95 In the end, the United States Supreme Court sided with
Webster and rejected the constitutionality of such a middle ground.96
In spite of the heated criticism and judicial repudiation of the sup-
posed inherent power of the people to revise their constitutions, the
circumvention conventions attracted popular support on the grounds
that the people ought to directly participate in constitutional revision.
Although orthodox American constitutional thought ultimately
rejected this principle and the infamous related concept of nullifica-
tion, this does not alter the legitimate place it assumed in contempo-
rary constitutional discourse. That nullification rested on a
"CONSTITUTIONAL right" was of "infinite importance" to its ad-
herents who also denied that they were appealing to natural rights or
94. See GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR 60-83, 159-61 (1976); GETrLEMAN,
supra note 89; Robert L. Ciaburri, The Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island: The Moderate
Phase, 26 R.I. HisT. 73 (1967); C. Peter Magrath, Optimistic Democrat" Thomas W. Dorr
and the Case of Luther vs. Borden, 29 R.I. HisT. 94 (1970); John S. Schuchman, The Polit-
ical Background of the Political-Question Doctrine: The Judges and the Dorr War, 16 AM. J.
LEGAL HST. 111 (1972); William M. Wiecek, 'A Peculiar Conservatism' and the Dorr Re-
bellion: Constitutional Clash in Jacksonian America, 22 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 237 (1978);
William M. Wiecek, Popular Sovereignty in the Dorr War-Conservative Counterblast, 32
R.I. HIST. 35 (1973).
95. George M. Dennison, An Empire of Liberty: Congressional Attitudes Toward Pop-
ular Sovereignty In The Territories, 1787-1867, 6 MD. Hisr. 19, 28 (1975).
96. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Some scholars, most notably
Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar in different ways, have asserted the theoretical existence
of a constitutional middle ground in terms of the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE =HE PEOP E: FOUNDATONS (1991); Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 55;
Amar, supra note 7. It is important to distinguish constitutional theorizing (that sometimes
draws upon history to inform and advance constitutional positions as part of a normative
judgment) from constitutional history (that seeks to understand the past on its own terms
without promoting a thesis for ideal constitutional interpretation). Ironically, both Amar
and Ackerman focus on the federal level-where the historical experience with a constitu-
tional middle ground was weakest-while largely ignoring the state level and its vibrant
tradition of debate and action based on such a middle ground. The extent to which such
state experience is relevant to the Federal Constitution is, of course, a theoretical question
rather than a historical one.
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to the right of revolution.97 Moreover, when James Madison opposed
nullification, he expressly denied the legitimacy of a constitutional
middle ground-at least with respect to changing the Federal Consti-
tution.98 The debate over nullification thus reinforced the vibrancy of
constitutional ideas reflective of an expansive view of popular sover-
eignty. Judged by its contemporary currency and invocation in state
constitutional debates, this expansive view of popular sovereignty rep-
resented more than a mere "strain of radical democracy." 99
If the Revolution gave birth to potentially diverse approaches to
self-government, the period from 1776 to 1787 witnessed the ascen-
dancy of a more constrained version of popular sovereignty that
culminated in the Federal Constitution. Reflecting uncertainty about
elections and the representative process, the Federal Framers "placed
their hopes for the country's future in giving government a structure
that would filter the will of the people and extract a beneficent es-
sence from the raw wishes of the majority."'010 Indeed, the elaborate
system of checks and balances and representative government were
designed to curb popular sovereignty. The Federal Constitution's si-
lence about the right of the people to resist oppressive government or
alter their government at will was not accidental. Such statements-
often found in state constitutions-invited a form of public participa-
tion the federal drafters were determined to quell.
Both in terms of what they omitted and included in the Constitu-
tion, the Framers underscored their passive view of popular sover-
97. Journal of the Convention of the People of South Carolina: Assembled at Columbia
on the 19th November, 1832, and Again, on the 11th March, 1833, at 60, 62 (Columbia, S.C.,
A.S. Johnston 1833); see also IRVING H. BARTLETr, JOHN C. CALHOUN 139-52 (1993);
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THn UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIANIsM, DEMOCRACY, STATES' RIGHTS
AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS (1987); WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL
WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836 (1966).
98. See WIEBE, supra note 51, at 247-48.
99. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 58, at 2-6. Their description of a "radical strain"
and the subsequent focus of their book suggests it had marginal importance with respect to
the development of an American constitutional tradition.
100. Morgan, supra note 33, at 111. A proponent of the Federal Constitution in Mary-
land applauded the complicated national legislature because of its tendency to produce
government by "the wisest and best men." Peter S. Onuf, Maryland: The Small Republic in
the New Nation, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 171, 173 (Michael Allen Gillespie &
Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). Jack Rakove notes the Federal Constitution's purpose to
"check populist excesses" in examining how the ratification process introduced the new
dangers of the power of public opinion. Jack Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Acces-
sion of George Washington, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 1, at 261,293; see also
Lurz, supra note 7, at 41, 237-38; Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the
Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORD. L.
REV. 115, 139-40 (1993).
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eignty. Their product reflected that "power may be derived from the
people; but once they elect officials, the power is transmitted; and the
people may not resume it unless magistrates abuse their authority."''1 1
If anything, the failure to declare the people's inherent right of revi-
sion and the inclusion of the Guarantee and Domestic Violence
Clauses accorded with "a contemporaneous process of delegitimizing
the resort to violence by the people as an extralegal means of defend-
ing the community interest when government failed to do so."1°2 In
"formalizing rights" the Framers "had done their best to close down
the style of argument most fertile of further rights production.' 1 3
The key to understanding how the Federalists could celebrate
popular sovereignty so fully rested with their transformation of "the
people" into an essentially abstract concept. Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison could repeatedly invoke popular sovereignty in The
Federalist Papers because the people were not expected to act in any
concrete manner in exercising their inherent powers. 0 4 "Once the
Federalists had conjured an imaginary 'people' who could not chal-
lenge the power of the national government, they became ever more
bold in declaring that the people had the right to decide, to act, and to
overthrow the government whenever they chose to do so."' 0 5 In at-
tributing sovereignty to a fictitious people, the Federalists "reduced
the acts of that people to one: the ratification of the Constitution,
symbolically interpreted as an act of the people.' 0 6 Thus, the Feder-
alists could celebrate popular sovereignty because "the sovereign peo-
ple were restrained once the Constitution was ratified."' 0 7
101. KAMMEN, supra note 52, at 24-25.
102. WIECEK, supra note 36, at 42.
103. RODGERS, supra note 20, at 66. In rejecting appeals to "extralegal rights" harken-
ing back to the revolutionary period, the message seemed clear: "Men were to be induced
to think, once more, soberly and legally. The state of nature, only recently discovered, was
already being abandoned." Id.
104. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 28, 78 (Alexander Hamilton), 39, 49, 63 (James
Madison). It has been aptly suggested that Hamilton turned "the formulas and stereotypes
of popular government against the logic of popular government." EDWIN MIMMS, JR., THE
MAJORrrY OF THE PEOPLE 96 (1941).
105. Miller, supra note 4, at 99, 104; see also WOOD, supra note 21, at 532.
106. Miller, supra note 4, at 115.
107. Appleby, supra note 1, at 804. Indeed, the security of having disarmed the concept
of popular sovereignty within the Federal Constitution led Madison to later propose a first
amendment to the document that would celebrate popular sovereignty. He proposed
"[t]hat there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration, that all power is originally vested
in, and consequently derived from, the people .... That the people have an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be
found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution." See 1 TIE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAIN-
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Epitomizing this passive version of popular sovereignty were the
high barriers to revision presented by Article V.108 One scholar has
called Article V's amendment process the "product of diminished
faith in the capacity of ordinary folk to be a fully sovereign people."'0 9
The sheer difficulty of calling future conventions or effecting amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution is amply borne out by its history." 0
With Article V, the Federal Framers successfully precluded the people
from acting in their collective capacity and invoking popular sover-
eignty as a constitutional justification for change.1 ' Whether the
ING IMPORTANT STATE PAPERS AND PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND ALL THE LAWS OF PUBLIC
NATURE 433-34 (Washington, Gales & Seator 1834-1856). Madison later said in debate,
"My idea of the sovereignty in the people is, that the people can change the Constitution if
they please; but while the Constitution exists, they must conform themselves to its dic-
tates." Id. at 739. Its "dictates," of course, include the daunting barriers to revision im-
posed by Article V.
108. Article V provides for a two-step process by which amendments must be proposed
by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress, and subsequently ratified by three-
fourths of the state legislatures or special state conventions called for this purpose. Fur-
thermore, in a provision never yet employed, Article V provides that two-thirds of the
states may petition Congress to call a special convention for proposing amendments. See
U.S. CONST. art. V.
For arguments that revision of the Federal Constitution has occurred outside of the
terms of Article V and need not be confined to those provisions, see ACKERMAN, supra
note 96, and Amar, supra note 7, at 1043-1104. For a critique of those views, see Dow,
supra note 7; Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Con-
stitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996).
109. KAMMEN, supra note 52, at 29; see also CONKIN, supra note 11, at 67 (claiming that
Article V "violated popular sovereignty" by allowing amendments solely by legislative ac-
tion); LUTZ, supra note 7, at 6-7; Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 100, at 162; Janet
Cornelius, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Change in the United States and Illinois
Constitutions, 80 ILL. HIsT. J. 228, 231 (1987) (quoting Walter Dellinger's description of
Article V as a "very conservative rendering of the right of revolution"); John R. Vile,
American Views of the Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article
V, 35 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr. 44, 48 (1991).
110. From 1791 to 1992, Article V has permitted formal ratification of less than one-
third of one percent of the more than 10,000 proposals for change. See RICHARD B. BERN-
STEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LovE THE CONSTITUTION So MUCH,
WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING To CHANGE IT? at x (1993). The authors thus estimate that
the chances of formal amendment at little better than 1 in 1,000. See id. at 169.
111. Madison's qualification of popular sovereignty in his proposed language for a first
amendment clearly represented the rejection of a constitutional middle ground in terms of
the Federal Constitution. See supra note 107. Indeed, John Vile has concluded as much by
suggesting that the omission of Madison's proposed language meant "that Americans had
come more clearly to distinguish those rights revolutionary in nature that needed no con-
stitutional sanction from those legal in nature and appropriate for inclusion in a constitu-
tion." JOHN VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDING PROCESS 105 (1993).
Bruce Ackerman's analysis of The Federalist demonstrates how ideal representation
consisted of "'the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity."' See ACKER-
MAN, supra note 96, at 185 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 63 at 428 (James Madison)
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Constitution rejected simple majoritarian government or democracy is
less the issue than the fact that its structure clearly worked against an
expansive interpretation of popular sovereignty.112 Indeed, contem-
porary opponents of the Constitution regarded the diminished role for
the people after ratification and the election of representatives as un-
dercutting the inalienable quality of popular sovereignty.113 In the
margin of his copy of the Federal Constitution, George Mason la-
mented that Article V only gave Congress the initiative to revise the
Constitution: "[S]hould it prove ever so oppressive, the whole people
of America can't make, or even propose alterations to it; a doctrine
utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and lib-
erties of the people."" 4
Like the experience of crafting the Federal Constitution, state
constitution-making arguably experienced a similar shift during this
period, epitomized by the 1790 revision of Pennsylvania's "radical"
1776 Constitution." 5 Although the radical potential of self-govern-
ment may well have been considered, and even occasionally mani-
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). More than a century earlier, a constitutional commentator
considered Article V a "prevalent disregard of immediate popular expression." JAMES
SCHOULER, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, STATE AND FEDERAL 185 (1897); cf. Levinson,
supra note 7, at 2444-60.
112. Joyce Appleby sees the framing of the Federal Constitution as a rejection of "sim-
ple majoritarian government in America .... Despite the celebration of popular sover-
eignty in America, the sovereign people were restrained once the constitution was ratified.
Perhaps nothing in the constitution has worked more against democracy than the amend-
ment process." Appleby, supra note 1, at 804.
113. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 295 (1986); Russell L. Hanson, "Commons" and "Common-
wealth" at the American Founding: Democratic Republicanism as the New American Hy-
brid, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTrrTIMON 165, 185-86 (Terence Ball &
J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988).
Ironically, some opponents of the Federal Constitution viewed Article V optimistically
as a mechanism that responded to the principle of the people's right to revision. See Kurt
T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing and Imple-
mentation of Article V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197 (1994). Jefferson's initial high hopes for
Article V turned to despair by the end of his lifetime. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, JEFFER-
SON AND MADISON AND THE MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONS 16-17 (1987).
114. 2 FARRAND, supra note 60, at 629 n.8. For Anti-Federalist concerns that the proce-
dures in Article V were too difficult and intricate, see 2 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
153, 250-51 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) and 3 id at 19-20, 46-47, 49-50.
Beyond what the shape of Article V suggested about the theoretical place of the peo-
ple in future constitutional revision, it could also be viewed as a practical necessity, without
this high barrier, the political compromises affecting sectional interests and those of the
larger versus smaller states would have been far less secure.
115. For a description of the "radical" nature of the Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution,
see Williams, supra note 45, at 554-58. With respect to state "constitutional reform" by the
1780s, see WOOD, supra note 21, at 430-38.
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fested as in Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution, it never took firm hold
on the minds of the post-revolutionary leadership. Constitution-mak-
ing in the decade following Independence reflected a trial and error
process that only belatedly attained a sophisticated and matured un-
derstanding. Associated with this development were the immediate
post-revolutionary experiences that emphasized the importance of in-
fusing republican governments with stability and virtuous leadership.
If some state constitution-making-as in the case of Pennsylvania-
consciously flirted with the radical possibilities introduced by the
Revolution, such experimentation ended as a short-lived failure. The
retrenchment of Pennsylvania's constitution in 1790 formed part of a
broader movement that had led to the formation of the Federal Con-
stitution. It marked a more realistic, measured, and wise approach to
constitution-making. Indeed, the relative absence of experimentation
with institutional arrangements in state constitution-making after 1787
apparently supports this traditional view.116
The perception of retreat from Pennsylvania's "radical" 1776
Constitution explains why scholars have discounted the enduring
resonance of the expansive dimension of popular sovereignty. That
"radical" experiment has consistently been regarded as a failure,
which is not surprising given its great differences from the Federal
Constitution, "the quintessential expression of the political wisdom of
the American people. 11 7 Clearly the most radical of the revolution-
ary state constitutions, Pennsylvania's 1776 document called for a uni-
cameral legislature with considerable supremacy, required legislative
and public deliberation on measures, annual elections, rotation in of-
fice, and periodic review of the government by specially elected over-
seers. Opposed from the start, its ultimate replacement came in 1790.
Scholars arguing for a re-evaluation of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitu-
tion conclude that the thrust of its constitutional ideas was largely dis-
sipated with the 1790 revision. 1 8
In expunging more radical constitutional arrangements, however,
Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution perpetuated ideas constituting the
core of broader understandings of constitutionalism. While the 1776
Constitution announced the community's right to "alter or abolish"
government in such manner as they judged "most conducive to the
public weal," the 1790 Constitution declared the people's right "at all
times" to "alter, or abolish" government "in such manner as they may
116. See Woon, supra note 21, at 430-38; Williams, supra note 35, at 43.
117. Ryerson, supra note 29, at 95, 98.
118. See, e.g., Ryerson, supra note 29, at 95, 131-33; Williams, supra note 45, at 581,585.
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think proper," thus reinforcing the people's discretion to act.119 Those
views continued to percolate in late eighteenth century constitutional
revision and became even more predominant in the course of the
nineteenth century. 20 Importantly, the theoretical basis of an expan-
sive version of popular sovereignty remained unchallenged in the sev-
eral decades of state constitution-making after the Revolution.
Moreover, constitution-making in that period consistently reflected a
more dynamic view of popular sovereignty, even as Americans cele-
brated the Federal Constitution. 2 1 Ideas, rather than institutional ar-
rangements, formed the crux of the persistence of an alternative
constitutional tradition. The vitality of such understandings from the
eighteenth century into the early nineteenth century is illustrated by
the questions inherent in popular sovereignty that arose as constitu-
tion-makers set about their task.
119. 8 SOURCES AND DocUMENTs OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 286 (William
Swindler ed., 1973-1988) [hereinafter SWINDLER]; see also Clair W. Keller, Pennsylvania's
Role in the Origin and Defeat of the First Proposed Amendment on Representation, 112
PENN. MAG. HIsT. & Bio. 73, 102 (1988) (noting the failure of Pennsylvania's 1790 Consti-
tution to eliminate "all vestiges of actual representation").
120. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190,221 (1993); Gregory
G. Schmidt, Republican Visions: Constitutional Thought and Constitutional Revision in
the Eastern United States, 1815-1830 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
John Taylor of Caroline's observations on Kentucky's 1792 Constitution prior to its
revision in 1799 reflect both the vitality of an expansive view of popular sovereignty and a
characterization of the Federal Constitution as a document embracing a more passive ver-
sion of the principle. Invited by Federal District Judge Harry Innes of Kentucky to offer
such criticisms as might help guide delegates to the 1799 Convention, Taylor stressed
changes that accorded with his belief in "'the only security for liberty,"' namely, "'by the
form of government, to retain in their [the people's] hands, as much political strength, as
may be consistent with good order and social happiness."' Tom K. Barton, John Taylor of
Caroline: Republicanism in the Kentucky Constitution of 1792, 73 REG. Ky. Hisr. Soc. 105,
109 (1975) (quoting John Taylor). In the same letter, Taylor also criticized the Federal
Constitution (and warned against following its spirit) for embodying an over-reliance on an
English "'theory of checking power by power' instead of "'retaining to the people, as
much political weight' as was safely possible to protect liberty. Id. He regarded the Fed-
eral Constitution, "'compiled by men in some degree under the impression of old modes of
thinking,"' as including ideas of balanced constitutions, "'which the English experiment
ought to have exploded."' Id.; see also JOAN WELLS COwARD, KENTUCKY IN TE NEw
REPUBLIC: THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 107-08 (1979).
121. One opponent of Ohio's 1802 Constitution bemoaned the fact that "'few constitu-
tions were ever so bepeopled as it is throughout."' Randolph C. Downes, Ohio's First
Constitution, 25 Nw. OHIO Q. 12, 17 (1953).
For the ways in which Americans celebrated the Federal Constitution, see Lance Ban-
ning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789-1793, 31 WM. &
MARY Q. 167 (1974), and MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF-
TE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTUm 43-94 (1986).
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IV. Questions Underlying Popular Sovereignty
A. What Is the Role of Legislatures?
Shortly after the Revolution, all the states confronted the ques-
tion of how to draft constitutions: Were state legislatures the appro-
priate body? Almost all of the very first American constitutions were
drafted by legislatures during the course of the war. While this prac-
tice of legislative drafting prompted criticism leading to its abandon-
ment, it had contemporary claims for its legitimacy beyond the
existing political and military exigencies. In the pre-revolutionary pe-
riod, the colonial assemblies and later the first state legislatures were
easily identified with the people because of their struggles against the
Royal government and parliament. That context made it natural to
regard the legislatures as speaking for the people. Hence, legislatures
were initially assumed to have the competence and authority to pro-
mulgate constitutions. However, as many increasingly disassociated
the legislature from the people, legislatures lost their acceptance as
appropriate bodies to create constitutions. With the declining percep-
tion of legislatures as the people, the felt need arose for constitutional
conventions as constituent assemblies.
Constitutional theorists and historians have regarded this initial
use of legislatures as an imperfect and immature understanding of
constitution-making.1' Scholars have argued that constitutions cre-
ated by legislatures ignored the important distinction between ordi-
nary law and constitutional law. 23  Legislative promulgation of
122. Willi Paul Adams argues that the first state constitutions were essentially drafted
as regular statutes. Although drafters were not altogether unaware of the special character
of constitutions, their distinction from ordinary law would not be clearly perceived for a
few years. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 64. In contrast, Russell Caplan asserts that the
distinction only emerged belatedly, with the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution as the first
instance of a mature understanding. See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 13 (1988).
Donald Lutz argues that the distinction was "only partial" in 1776 and was only fully ar-
ticulated by Massachusetts in 1780 and New Hampshire in 1784. See LuTZ, supra note 55,
at 99-100; see also WOOD, supra note 21, at 274-75,279; Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Popu-
lar Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL.
51, 62 (1986). Moreover, in Popular Consent and Popular Control, Donald Lutz disputes
Bernard Bailyn's claim that Americans prior to the Revolution had begun to distinguish
between constitutional and ordinary law. See LuTz, supra note 7, at 63-64. Paul Conkin
asserts that only when South Carolina elected delegates in 1790 to a "proper" convention,
did it attain a "real" constitution. See CONKIN, supra note 11, at 53.
123. See Leonard W. Levy, Seasoned Judgments: The American Constitution, Rights,
and History 295-98 (1995). Joyce Appleby regards the lack of veneration of constitutions
and the desire to rewrite them as indicating the absence in the 1780s of a "culture of consti-
tutionalism," which included recognizing constitutions as limits on government that re-
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constitutions also lacked constitutional sophistication. 24 As the ne-
cessities of the war receded and demand for constitutions drafted
through constituent assemblies increased, Americans wanted constitu-
tional conventions. Eventually, conventions and popular ratification
translated theoretical sovereignty into a concrete expression of gov-
ernmental structure, organization, and policy.
This conventional view of early American constitution-making
bears re-examination of several particulars, not the least of them its
assumption that the legislators who drafted those constitutions did not
appreciate the distinction between ordinary and constitutional law.
By the 1780s, constitution-makers better understood the creation of
fundamental law-the need to draft constitutions in specially called
conventions that were submitted for popular approval. Belated em-
ployment of conventions preserved the crucial distinction between or-
dinary and constitutional law. New Hampshire and Massachusetts
constitution-making foreshadowed this matured understanding. Mas-
sachusetts's 1780 Constitution in particular provided "the reconsid-
ered ideal of a 'perfect constitution"' in large part by employing both
a constitutional convention and ratification.125 The Federal Constitu-
tion epitomized this approach in American constitution-making.
strained legislative discretion. See Appleby, supra note 1, at 800; see also Douglass, supra
note 34, at 126-27; Schmidt, supra note 120, at 5. But the lack of veneration and the desta-
bilizing effects that frequent constitutional revision might bring does not necessarily indi-
cate a failure to recognize constitutions as fundamental law. The source of their creation-
popular sovereignty-and not how infrequently they were altered gave them their ultimate
legitimacy. Thus, frequent changes in constitutions were hardly inconsistent with a clear
recognition of the difference between ordinary and constitutional law.
Other scholars rightly emphasize the crucial importance of the distinction between
ordinary and constitutional law. Gerald Stourzh regards the "rise of the constitution as the
paramount law, reigning supreme and therefore invalidating, if procedurally possible, any
law of lower level in the hierarchy of legal norms, including 'ordinary' legislator-made law"
as "the great innovation and achievement of American eighteenth century constitutional-
ism." Gerald Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seven-
teenth to the Late Eighteenth Century, in CONCErTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 113, at 47. The fact that their constitutions distinguished between ordinary law
and higher law, rather than the fact that they were written, is what gave the revolutionaries
their rightful pride for an innovation in governmental practices. Moreover, Thad Tate ar-
gued that the social contract and the idea of constitution as fundamental law were closely
linked in American thought, "for it was in its origin in a solemn agreement of the people
that made the constitution superior to ordinary legislative acts." Tate, supra note 55, at
379.
124. See ONut, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that promulgated constitutions that created
state governments "subject to frequent alteration lacked legitimacy"); John V. Orth, North
Carolina Constitutional History, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1759, 1762 (1992).
125. WOOD, supra note 21, at 434; see also CONICN, supra note 11, at 57 (stating that
Massachusetts's 1780 Constitution represented "full compliance with the logic of popular
sovereignty"); MORGAN, supra note 13, at 258-60; Willi Paul Adams, The State Constitu-
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Focusing on procedural deficiencies in early constitution-mak-
ing126 overlooks the fundamental basis of constitutions-their source
of authority. The eventual uniform practice of using conventions as a
means to express the people's constituent power has confused the dis-
tinction between ordinary and constitutional law on the one hand and
what the process of constitution-making reflected about constitutional
attitudes on the other. Even before constitution-making followed the
routine procedure of reflecting the will of the people through the use
of conventions, Americans distinguished between constitutions and
statutes.127 Indeed, historian Bernard Bailyn has observed that prior
to the Revolution some Americans acknowledged the fundamentality
of constitutions if they were to control government.128  Moreover,
drafters of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution sought specifically to bar
the legislature from violating its provisions. 2 9 These insights, how-
ever, have been overlooked by the flawed assumption that only after
tions as Analogy and Precedent: The American Experience with Constituent Power Before
1787, 34 AMERIKASTUDIEN 7, 13 (1989); Alexander J. Celia, The People of Massachusetts,
A New Republic, and the Constitution of 1780: The Evolution of Principles of Popular Con-
trol of Political Authority, 1774-1780, 14 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 975, 990 (1980); Levy, supra
note 123, at 307 (describing the Massachusetts 1780 Constitution as "the classic American
state constitution"); Andrew C. McLaughlin, American History and American Democracy,
2 AM. HisT. REv. 255, 264-65 (1915) (describing the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution as
"the fully developed constitution, the greatest institution of government which America
has produced"); R.R. Palmer, The People as Constituent Power, in THE ROLE OF IDEOL-
OGY IN THE AMERICAN REvoLrION 76-80 (John R. Howe, Jr. ed., 1970); Paul C. Rear-
don, The Massachusetts Constitution Marks a Milestone, 12 PUBLts 45, 45-55 (1982).
126. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 19, at 63-66,75,89 (stating that the use of conventions
and ratification formed a "crucial combination" in distinguishing between ordinary and
constitutional law); WALTER F. DODD, THE REVIsION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CON-
sTITUTIONS 1-29 (1910); LUTZ, supra note 7, at 63-64, 67-68, 82-84 (linking the absence of
conventions and popular ratification with a failure to appreciate the distinction between
ordinary and constitutional law); Robert J. Taylor, Constitution of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, 90 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC. 317 (1980).
127. See Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States,
1776-1860: A Study in the Evolution of Democracy 51-52, 58-60, 66 (1930); Palmer, supra
note 125, at 75-76. In 1776, voters in two North Carolina counties instructed their legisla-
tors on impending constitution-making by noting that political power was of two kinds, one
"principal and supreme" possessed "only by the people at large" and the other "derived
and inferior" possessed "by the servants they employ." 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA 870b, 870f (William L. Saunders ed., Raleigh, N.C., Edwards &
Broughton Press 1890).
128. See BAILYN, supra note 54, at 175-84. Edmund Morgan traces the emergence of
the distinction back even further, to seventeenth century Leveller criticisms of Parliament.
See MORGAN, supra note 13, at 81.
129. See John N. Shaeffer, Public Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,
98 PENN. MAG. HIsr. & BIo. 433, 433-35 (1974); see also Robert F. Williams, The State
Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its In-
fluences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMv. L. REv. 541, 566, 578 (1989).
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the emergence of specially elected conventions did Americans appre-
ciate the distinction between ordinary and constitutional law. This
mischaracterization ignored the source that provided constitutions
their fundamentality-they were the products of a sovereign people.
Framers of the first state constitutions implicitly located the
power of constitution-making in the people when more than half of
them failed to include a procedure for future revision or amend-
ment.130 This omission implied that the people retained an inherent
right to revise their constitutions at will, thus making specific proce-
dures unnecessary.
The absence of revision provisions in eighteenth century state
constitutions did not prevent later legislative calls for constitutional
conventions. 131 Neither did the existence of such procedures prevent
legislatures from ignoring them in calling for future constitutional con-
ventions.132 For example, Connecticut, which elected to remain under
its colonial charter after the Revolution, summoned a convention in
1818 under its legislature's "general powers.' 33 Such action pre-
sumed the people's inherent right of revision."3
130. Of the 11 colonies that drafted initial state constitutions (Rhode Island and Con-
necticut remaining under their colonial charters) Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York had no provisions for future constitutional
changes. Pennsylvania (later copied by Vermont in 1777) provided for a septennial possi-
bility of future conventions to consider amendments, and Georgia provided that the legis-
lature might call a convention if a majority of the voters wished. Delaware and Maryland
alluded to possible future revision, but did so ambiguously, Delaware providing that
changes in the bulk of the constitution could not occur without five-sevenths consent of its
assembly and seven members of the legislative council, and Maryland providing that no
constitutional changes could be made unless a bill to do so passed the legislature and after
the next election was confirmed by the next legislature. Massachusetts's 1780 Constitution
simply provided for a vote on the issue of holding another convention in 1795. Thus, of all
the first state constitutions drafted, only Pennsylvania and Vermont explicitly provided a
procedure for constitutional amendment.
131. See, for example, the constitutional conventions in New York (1801 and 1821),
Rhode Island (1824), Virginia (1829 and 1850), South Carolina (1778 and 1790), North
Carolina (1835), New Hampshire (1784), and New Jersey (1844). Likewise, the absence of
a provision for future constitutional conventions in Delaware's 1776 Constitution-
although it alluded to future revision-did not impede a convention in 1791 to draft a new
constitution.
132. JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERIcAN STATE CONsTrUTIONS: FROM
1776 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1914, at 33, 49 (De Capo Press 1972) (1915); Schmidt,
supra note 120, at 24; White, supra note 27, at 1132, 1137.
133. DEALEY, supra note 132, at 42.
134. See id. at 32, 41-49; see also CHARLES BORGEAUD, ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT
OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 181 (1895); Richard L. Mumford, Constitu-
tional Development in the State of Delaware, 1776-1897, at 111 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Delaware).
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The first legislatures that "made" constitutions demonstrated-in
preambles and addresses-their understanding of popular sovereignty
as the source of constitutional authority.135 Virtually all the first con-
stitutions were justified as "authorized" or "empowered" by the peo-
ple.1 36 New York's 1777 constitution-makers, for example, repeatedly
asserted that they acted "in the name and by the authority of the peo-
ple."' 37 Despite being legislators, they spoke with the voice of the
people. Such language alluded to popular sovereignty as the basis for
constitutional authority, even as the tendency of equating the legisla-
ture with the people came under increasing criticism.
Those statements have been discounted because the legislators
were not specially elected to constitutional conventions.' 38 Scholars
have not appreciated the widespread public consultation preceding
the first wave of American constitution-making. All but two states
whose legislatures framed early constitutions did so after elections
held in anticipation of future constitution-making.'3 9 Even Massachu-
setts-which pioneered the traditional means of constitution-making
(that is, by a convention followed by popular ratification)-legisla-
tively created a constitution after asking and receiving special voter
authorization.1 ° A few dissenting Massachusetts towns eventually
simulated specially elected constitutional conventions. 14 ' The use of
conventions in Massachusetts, however, "originated" in "mistrust" of
135. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 64.
136. See Goldstein, supra note 122, at 51, 59. Willi Paul Adams recognizes this aware-
ness in those drafters who "stressed ... the representative character of the assembly" that
placed the constitutions in force. Id. At the same time, however, he infers that those
constitution-makers failed to appreciate the distinction between ordinary and constitu-
tional law. In noting the legislative creation of South Carolina's 1788 Constitution, Adams
concludes, "Once again, a state constitution had been treated as no more than a series of
laws." Id. at 72.
137. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, preamble, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 168-
72. Similarly, Pennsylvania's legislators, in drafting its first constitution, described them-
selves as "the representatives of the freemen of Pennsylvania, in general convention met,
for the express purpose" of framing a government. PA. CONST. of 1776, preamble, re-
printed in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 277. They justified promulgating the constitu-
tion "by virtue of the authority vested" in them by their constituents.
138. Thus, while conceding that New Hampshire's Legislature had claimed the people's
authority to make a constitution, Willi Paul Adams stresses the fact that their preamble
"was phrased in the form typical of a parliamentary resolution." ADAMS, supra note 19, at
64, 69. When legislatures suggested the desirability of a convention to draft a constitution,
Adams characterizes them as having anticipated "a great step forward in the practical de-
velopment of modern constitutionalism." Id. at 75.
139. See id. at 68-93. Only Virginia and New Jersey were the exceptions within the
eleven constitution-making states between 1776 and 1780.
140. See id. at 90.
141. See id.
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the legislature rather than in a perceived requirement of popular sov-
ereignty. 42 Likewise, part of the reason for using a special conven-
tion to frame Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution came from a suspicion
that the legislature did not represent the true revolutionary sentiments
of Pennsylvanians.
Not all of the demand for conventions can be attributed to doubts
about how solidly the legislatures supported the cause of indepen-
dence. Some Americans apparently resisted the legislative creation of
constitutions because they distinguished between constitutions and
statutes. 43 Nonetheless, many of the first constitution-makers were
not confused about the nature of the proper source of a constitution,
even if they failed to employ what became the standard mechanism
for its creation, the constitutional convention.
144
An examination of the early demands for special conventions to
draft constitutions reveals the people's concern that constitutions
should operate as fundamental law. The best known resistance to leg-
islatively created constitutions emerged in Massachusetts in 1776
when several towns rejected that approach, which was proposed and
142. Id. at 64-65.
143. See Williams, supra note 45, at 552,566. Adams implies it was half the solution for
a "true constitutional convention." ADAMS, supra note 19, at 79-80, 92.
An anonymous Philadelphia pamphlet in 1776 did declare that conventions "are the
only proper bodies to form a Constitution, and Assemblies are the proper bodies to make
Laws agreeable to that constitution." See The Alarm: or, an Address to the People of Penn-
sylvania on the Late Resolve of Congress, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1768-1805, at 321, 326 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S.
Lutz eds., 1983). The basis for the call for a convention, however, primarily rested on the
fact the author did not see the present legislature as possessing "the entire confidence of
the people." Id. at 325. The current legislature was not the "proper body" to make a
constitution because it suffered from a series of "disqualification[s], inconsistencies,
prejudices, and private interests." Id. at 327. Indeed, the common trait of the framers and
supporters of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution was their status as political outsiders:
"Those men, their fathers, and the communities in which they had grown to maturity had
been firmly excluded from political power." Ryerson, supra note 29, at 99. As such, they
hardly felt a close affinity with the existing body that wielded legislative authority.
144. Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a
Case Study, 67 J. AM. HisT. 797, 813 (1981) (stating that one of the "hallmarks of American
constitutional development" was the process of identifying "legitimate, constituent author-
ity with the conventions themselves and to grant constitutional as well as temporal priority
to these extra legal, supra legal, and temporary organizations").
Gordon Wood writes that Americans experienced "confusion" during the revolution-
ary period over creating fundamental law, eventually solving this problem by adopting
Jefferson's assertion of a special body to frame a constitution, using the Massachusetts and
New Hampshire constitutions as models. Americans groped their way to an understanding
of creating fundamental law via a shift from their belief that legislatures were the
equivalent of the people to increasing suspicion of legislation and legislators. See WOOD,
supra note 18, at 911-26.
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ultimately followed by the legislature. 145 The most explicit objections
came from Concord, which in October 1776 asserted that the legisla-
ture was not "a Body proper to form & Establish a Constitution."'1 46
They explained their position as follows:
[F]irst Because we Conceive that a Constitution in its Proper
Idea intends a System of Principles Established to Secure the
Subject in the Possession & enjoyment of their Rights and Privi-
leges, against any Encroachment of the Governing Part-2d Be-
cause the Same Body that forms a Constitution have of
Consequence a power to alter it. 3d Because a Constitution al-
terable by the Supreme Legislative is no Security at all to the
Subject against any Encroachment of the Governing part on any
or on all of their Rights & privileges.' 47
Their reasons thus assumed that a constitution framed by the legisla-
ture would not be fundamental because the legislature retained the
power to change the constitution. That assumption, however, ulti-
mately rested on seeing a clear distinction between the people and
"the Governing Part." To the extent the legislature did not represent
the people, they could hardly invest a constitution with the fundamen-
tal status that came from sovereignty. Concerns about the representa-
tiveness of the legislature were clearly evident in Massachusetts: the
principal objection to the constitution produced by the legislature, for
instance, was not its failure to employ a convention, but a perceived
malapportionment of the house of representatives."
Thomas Jefferson's criticism of Virginia's 1776 Constitution like-
wise stemmed from a belief that it did not represent the will of the
people. He objected that "no special authority had been delegated by
the people to form a permanent constitution," and the convention del-
egates drafting it "had been elected for the ordinary purposes of legis-
lation only, and at a time when the establishment of a new
government had not been proposed or contemplated. 1 49 What dis-
145. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 87-91; Celia, supra note 125, at 988-90; Reardon,
supra note 125, at 50.
146. MASSACHUSETrS, COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH: DOCUMENTS ON THE FORMA-
TION OF rIs CONSTITUTION, 1775-1780, at 44 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1961) [hereinafter COL-
ONY TO COMMONWEALTH].
147. Id at 45.
148. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 91.
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Hambden Pleasant (April 19, 1824), in 10
THE WoRKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 28, at 302, quoted in A.E. Dick Howard,
"For the Common Benefit": Constitutional History in Virginia as a Casebook for the Mod-
em Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REv. 816,837 (1968); see also PETERSON, supra note 113,
at 4.
When the legitimacy of New Jersey's 1776 Constitution was challenged in 1802 as not
having been popularly ratified, the court likewise noted the lack of a mandate to the legis-
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turbed Jefferson more than the absence of popular ratification was
that the drafters did not clearly identify the distinctive nature of con-
stitutional law. He expressed the same concerns with respect to the
"dangerous doctrine" that the people's acquiescence was sufficient to
overcome the absence of authority to frame a constitution in the first
place.' 50
B. Must Constitutions Be Popularly Ratified?
Just as scholars argue that legislatively created constitutions can-
not be regarded as "true" constitutions, they regard early constitu-
tions as flawed because they lacked popular ratification. 15 1 However,
focusing on the central importance American constitution-makers
placed on the source of constitutional law rather than on the need for
popular ratification resolves this perceived deficiency. If the para-
mount authority of constitutions was derived from popular sover-
eignty, then formal ratification was unnecessary to the extent that
constitution-makers embodied the people in their primary capacity.
Popular ratification remained consistent with the underlying principle
of popular sovereignty because ratification implied the validation of
the people who were the ultimate source of political authority. None-
theless, Americans could and would continue to create constitutions
without requiring ratification well into the nineteenth century, and
could arguably do so without violating the principle of popular sover-
eignty. Thus, in the manner in which they invoked the power of the
people and described themselves as the people assembled, the consti-
tution-making legislatures responded to the central truth of the
Revolution. The practice of legislatures claiming to speak as the peo-
ple stemmed from a colonial pattern in which popularly elected as-
semblies took the side of the people in struggles against the colonial
lature to form a constitution, but concluded that the acquiescence by the people resolved
the issue. See State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. (4 Halsted) 427 (decided in 1802, but reported in
1828); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 5 (1990).
150. See Howard, supra note 149, at 837.
151. In noting that only 5 of 28 constitutions drafted between 1776 and 1800 had been
formally ratified, Donald Lutz concludes Americans were "still groping for the full implica-
tions of the distinction" between ordinary and constitutional law by 1800. LuTz, supra
note 10, at 83. Many scholars argue that the assumption of popular ratification was inte-
gral to proper American constitutionalism. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 120, at 8;
CONKIN, supra note 15, at 59; LEVY, supra note 139, at 295-98; Donald S. Lutz, From
Covenant to Constitution in American Political Thought, 10 PUBLIUS 101, 121 (1980); John
V. Orth, "Fundamental Principles" in North Carolina Constitutional History, 69
N.C.L.Rav. 1357, 1358 (1969); WOOD, supra note 24, at 924.
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governors and the King's ministers. 52 With legislatures often per-
ceived as "the people assembled" and not as the "government," it
seemed unnecessary to use special conventions. 53
Despite the frequent creation of constitutions without special
conventions during the revolutionary period, some of those initial
constitutions incorporated indirect ratification practices that later be-
came standardized. Practices that fell short of formal ratification pro-
vide additional, neglected evidence of an early understanding of
popular sovereignty that distinguished between ordinary and constitu-
tional law. In Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution, for example, pro-
posed constitutional amendments required publication for six months
before a second convention could ratify them.' 54 Thus, even without
direct ratification, the people were consulted. 'Seeking and receiving
input from the people apparently satisfied the principle of popular
sovereignty. The six-month period provided "for the previous consid-
eration of the people, that they may have an opportunity of in-
structing their delegates on the subject."' 55 Such instruction identified
the people as the source of popular authority, a point that that consti-
tution underscored by requiring even ordinary legislation to undergo
two successive votes by the legislature.
56
A second means of indirect popular ratification surfaced in Mary-
land's 1776 Constitution. That constitution provided for constitu-
152. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); JACK P.
GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN
ROYAL COLONIES, 1689-1776 (1963); LUTZ, supra note 55, at 152.
153. Lurz, supra note 55, at 152 (agreeing with Wood's argument in The Creation of the
American Republic)..
154. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 285.
155. Id.
156. See id. at § 15, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 281. This feature of the
"radical" constitution received particular criticism; a North Carolina constitution-maker in
1776 called it a "'washing in ordure by way of purification."' Elisha P. Douglass, Thomas
Burke, Disillusioned Democrat, 26 N.C. Hist. REv. 150, 158 (1950) (quoting Letter from
William Hooper to Samuel Johnson (Sept. 1776)).
Even if Pennsylvania took the principle of consultation with the people to an extreme
by incorporating it into the process of ordinary lawmaking, other American constitutions
routinely allowed constitutional amendments after successive votes of the legislature. See
S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 476; DEL. CONST. of 1792,
reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 205; GA, CONST. of 1798, reprinted in 2 SwIN.
DLER, supra note 119, at 452. Even later in the nineteenth century, as the practice of formal
ratification grew more commonplace, state constitutions perpetuated a practice of legisla-
tive constitutional amendment. See Mo. CoNsT. of 1820, art. XII, reprinted in 5 SWINDLER,
supra note 119, at 487; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 35, reprinted in 1 SWINDLER, supra
note 119, at 344; FLA, CONST. of 1838, art. XIV, § 2, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note
119, at 328.
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tional change after successive votes by the state legislature. 157 The
interim period between legislative sessions allowed the people to con-
sider and convey their reactions dealing with the suggested change.15 8
Thereafter, the vote by the second legislature provided constitutional
validation. 159 Once again, such a process recognized that the people
remained the ultimate source of constitutional will, even if their direct
action was unnecessary to finalize constitutional change. Moreover,
Maryland's 1776 Constitution offered further proof of an early distinc-
tion between ordinary and constitutional law. Its bill of rights specifi-
cally stated that constitutional changes could not be made by the
legislature, but only in accordance with the revision procedures. 60
This language suggested the perception that use of successive votes by
the legislature to change the constitution was not merely "legislative"
action. Rather, it legitimately brought about constitutional change
through the necessary, if indirect, involvement of the people.
Even the earliest calls for direct popular ratification reflect a con-
cern with linking constitutions to the source from which they drew
their fundamental power. From the start of the Revolution, some
Americans clearly drew a connection between the necessity of consul-
tation and popular sovereignty. A petition to the Massachusetts Leg-
islature from the town of Pittsfield in 1776 claimed "the basic right of
the citizenry to pass upon new constitutions.' 6' The petition, written
by Reverend Thomas Allen, asserted:
We .. .have always been persuaded that the people are the
fountain of power .... That the Approbation of the Majority of
the people of this fundamental Constitution is absolutely neces-
sary to give Life and being to it . . . . That a Representative
Body may form, but cannot impose said fundamental Constitu-
tion upon a people. They being but servants of the people can-
not be greater than their Masters, & must be responsible to
them. If this fundamental Constitution is above the whole Leg-
islature, the Legislature cannot certainly make it, it must be the
Approbation of the Majority which gives Life & being to it.'62
157. See MD. CONST. of 1776, § 59, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 383.
158. See id.
159. See id, This mechanism for making constitutional amendments has a modem ana-
log: Delaware's present constitution permits amendments after two successive legislative
votes without popular ratification. See Opinion of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342 (Del. 1970).
160. See MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 42, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra
note 119, at 375.
161. Reardon, supra note 125, at 49.
162. COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH, supra note 146, at 27-28. The town of Lexington
also petitioned for ratification. See THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY:
DocuMENTs ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 149-51 (Oscar Handlin &
Mary Handlin eds., 1966) [hereinafter POPULAR SOURCES].
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While Massachusetts pioneered such expressions, Americans else-
where also desired some form of popular ratification or consultation
with the people. New York City mechanics in 1776 protested a propo-
sal for framing a constitution without ratification by the voters, declar-
ing that "[i]nhabitants at large exercise the right which God has given
them, in common with all men, to judge whether it be consistent with
their interest to accept, or reject, a Constitution framed for that State
of which they are members. 11 63 Moreover, the voters of two North
Carolina counties explicitly instructed their legislators to submit the
constitution to be drafted by the legislature, to the people "that it may
derive its force from the principal supreme power." ' 64
Implicitly underlying these calls for popular ratification, however,
was a desire to recognize what gave constitutions their paramount au-
thority. In the words of Reverend Allen, if the constitution was
"above" the legislature, the people-through ratification-had to
breath "life" into fundamental law. The reason the legislature could
not "make" a constitution in Massachusetts owed less to the fact that
the constitution would subsequently control the legislature than the
fact that the legislature was not viewed as the people assembled for
the purpose of creating a constitution.165 Ratification simply recog-
nized that constitutional law stemmed from the people in their sover-
eign capacity. Popular sovereignty lay at the heart of American
constitution-making, not the practice of popular ratification. Notwith-
standing a few early objections, it was possible to accept constitutions
as fundamental even if they lacked ratification and, initially at least,
were produced without special constitutional conventions.
Eventually, mounting criticism similar to that of Reverend Allen
and increasing suspicion of legislation and legislators prompted the
use of conventions as the appropriate method of wielding the "constit-
uent power" of the people. 66 As the natural identity between the
163. Staughton Lynd, The Mechanics in New York Politics, 1774-1788,5 LAB. Hist. 225,
231 (1964); see also BERNARD MASON, TH ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE: THE REVOLUTION-
ARY MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK, 1773-1777, at 155-59 (1966).
164. See 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 127, at 870d,
870g; DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 125-29.
165. An analyst of the Pittsfield petition has pointed out that the petitioners asserted
that "although the General Court [the legislature] could form a constitution, the legislators
could not 'impose said fundamental Constitution upon a people."' Celia, supra note 125,
at 988. The crucial issue was perceiving "legislators" as essentially different from the
people.
166. In describing how Americans came to understand the creation of fundamental law,
Gordon Wood describes the shift from believing legislatures were the equivalent of the
people to the increasing suspicion of legislation and legislators. See WOOD, supra note 21,
at 223-24. To the extent that an equivalency between the legislatures and the people be-
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legislatures and the people diminished, expectations for the employ-
ment of constitutional conventions grew. To some extent, conventions
gained what the legislature lost. The transition, however, represented
more than merely the transfer of trust and faith from one body to the
next. Along with a shift in confidence came a growing awareness of
the significance of the convention and its role in American republican
government. Conventions eventually symbolized the exercise of the
sovereign power as well as the only legitimate means of founding a
republican government. To the extent that conventions now viewed
themselves as the embodiment of the people, they proceeded in the
nineteenth century to promulgate constitutions or constitutional
amendments consistent with the principle of popular sovereignty. In-
deed, one commentator has described James Madison's position in
The Federalist Papers as providing authority for a view of conventions
as the "perfect substitutes for the people themselves."'167
C. Which People Could Create and Revise Constitutions?
Acknowledging that the people were sovereign raised another is-
sue of early constitution-making: Who were "the people" who could
create or revise constitutions? In states that had formerly been colo-
nies, the pre-existing political body provided a natural continuity.
However, constitution-making in areas that had not been original col-
onies directly raised this question. Vermont's experience illustrated
the challenge in identifying who was entitled to invoke popular sover-
eignty. In 1776, the Continental Congress recommended that the col-
onies reorganize their governments solely on the basis of "the
authority of the people."' 68 Settlers in the area that is now Vermont
responded by proclaiming their right to become an independent state
from territory jointly claimed by New Hampshire and New York. In
so doing, they asserted popular sovereignty to justify framing a consti-
tution in 1777, citing both the Declaration of Independence and the
1776 congressional resolution. Numerous other separatist movements
came increasingly problematic, Gerald Stourzh identifies written constitutions as acquiring
authority and legitimacy through "the dissociation of legislature and sovereign power" and
the "institutionalization of the constituent power of the people." Gerald Stourzh, Funda-
mental Laws and Individual Rights in the 18th Century Constitution, in 5 BiCENMNNIAL
ESSAY 17, 18 (1984); see also ADAMS, supra note 19, at 65; 122; LuTz, supra note 55, at 152;
WooD, supra note 21, at 306-25, 336-38; Goldstein, supra note 138, at 51, 61.
167. ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 177-78.
168. ADAMS, supra note 19, at 59-62.
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also justified their claims for statehood on the principle of popular
sovereignty.169
The framework for creating new states initially emerged in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.17° Only with Ohio in 1802, however,
did Congress establish its model for creating new states. Before then,
new states had drafted constitutions without formal congressional au-
thorization. 171 Although congressional enabling acts emerged as a
presumptive prerequisite to the formation of constitutions, it hardly
became a uniform practice.172 Indeed, states entering the union in the
nineteenth century formed their constitutions as often without explicit
congressional consent as they did under congressional enabling acts.
That pattern reflected the continuing dynamic of self-determination
and popular sovereignty.
However illusive, "the people" was not a mere mythical concept.
Rather, popular sovereignty formed the actual basis of republican
governments and political action. 73 But even scholars who recognize
the centrality of popular sovereignty in American constitution-making
have tended to regard popular sovereignty as a fiction or an illu-
sion.174 This judgment rests on the legacy of the amendment provi-
169. See ONUF, supra note 3, at 24, 34-35, 63, 65-66.
170. For the Northwest Ordinance generally, see THm NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ES-
SAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1989);
PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
(1987); Arthur Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of
Consensus, 1754-1784, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 13, 13-15 (John Porter
Bloom ed., 1973); Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Docu-
ment, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1995).
171. See, for example, the experiences of Vermont in 1777 and Kentucky in 1792.
172. See GORDON M. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTH-UTION MAKING, 1850-1912,
at 5 (1987); Dennison, supra note 95, at 19-40.
173. See MORGAN, supra note 13, at 281-84, 306; PETERS, supra note 65, at 44-45; ROD-
GERS, supra note 20, at 3-11, 13-14. James Wilson's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 DalI.) 419 (1793), prophetically noted the tendency to confuse the basis of American
governments-a sovereign people-with discussions of sovereignty that entailed the state or
government. He pointed out that basing the American Revolution on popular sovereignty
represented a rejection of the British theory of government, under which, in "legal contem-
plation," the people "totally disappear." Id. at 462. Despite the acceptance of the founda-
tional principle of popular sovereignty, Wilson lamented the political incorrectness of the
term the "United States" instead of the "People of the United States":
The States, rather than the people, for whose sakes the States exist, are frequently
the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I believe, has
produced much of the confusion and perplexity, which have appeared in several
proceedings and several publications on state politics, and on the politics too, of
the United States.
Id.
174. See MORGAN, supra note 13; MOSTov, supra note 11, at 60-76; ONUF, supra note 3,
at 38; Miller, supra note 4, at 99-119. Gordon Wood recognizes the reality that popular
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sions of the Federal Constitution and its tradition of judicial
constitutional adjustments in lieu of formal constitutional revision.
This historical confinement of "the people" in any practical sense with
respect to the Federal Constitution has also led scholars to discount
popular sovereignty statements in state constitutions as meaningless
or merely rhetorical. 175
But experiences with popular sovereignty at the level of state
constitution-making proved significantly different from those at the
federal level. The situation of the Vermont settlers posed the issue of
creating an independent political entity based on popular sovereignty
for the first time since the colonial conflict with Britain.176 Yet, the
domestic possibilities for constitution-making as a means of substanti-
ating such claims for recognition were only beginning. 77 By 1782, one
observer lamented the "epidemic... Spirit of making new States."' 78
sovereignty had for some Americans after the Revolution, but concludes that such a vision
lost its efficacy as a constitutional idea with a transformation in thought about politics and
constitutions by the late 1780s. See WooD, supra note 21, at 344-89, 593-615. As early as
1919, Harold J. Laski described popular sovereignty as an "impossible fiction" if it meant
"that the whole people is, in all but executive detail, to govern itself." Harold J. Laski, The
Theory of Popular Sovereignty, 17 MICH. L. REv. 201, 204 (1919).
175. See, eg., SUBER, supra note 27, at 225-32.
176. See ONUF, supra note 3, at 127-45. "According to the emerging standards of
American constitutionalism, Vermont's claims to self-government became increasingly
credible. The 'right' was not derived from history or higher authority; it came from its own
constitution." Id. at 143.
177. Maine's efforts at independence from Massachusetts raised this issue. The move-
ment for separation, of course, faced a range of political objections from the Massachusetts
Legislature. In addition, the separatists were confronted with identifying a discrete "peo-
ple" justified in invoking popular sovereignty to create an independent status. Unlike
Massachusetts, Maine had to rest its claims exclusively on the basis of popular sovereignty.
One Maine separatist asserted that "the people alone have an incontestible, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to institute governments, and to reform, alter, or totally change the
same." ONUF, supra note 3, at 29; see also JOHN D. BARNHART, VALLEY OF DEMOCRACY:
THE FRONTIER VERSUS THE PLANTATION IN THE OHIO VALLEY, 1775-1818, at 45-65
(1953); MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MAINE: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 1-2 (1992); Harry B. Virgin, The Constitutional Convention of 1819, in 2 COLLEC-
TIONS OF THE MAINE HISTORICAL SOCmITY 416 (1906).
Maine also illustrates the wide variety of ways a people capable of self-government
and establishing constitutions could be recognized. Maine eventually drafted its constitu-
tion after Massachusetts released its claims on that region. Thus, the convention that
drafted the Constitution of 1819 met under a statute passed by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture rather than a congressional enabling act. The issue of Maine's separation from Massa-
chusetts had generated discussions and conventions for more than thirty years before the
achievement of statehood in 1819. Indeed, a convention in 1786 had urged separation,
arguing that government "is a very simple, easy thing" and would secure "the good of the
people: and the blessings of life." Id. at 418.
178. ONUF, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Letter from Hugh Williamson to Governor
Martin (Nov. 18, 1782)).
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Not all the efforts to invoke the constituent power of the people
to create constitutions proved successful. One such ill-fated endeavor
took place in the Monongahela River valley, west of the Appalachians
in a region claimed both by Pennsylvania and Virginia soon after the
Revolution. Settlers in that area petitioned for recognition by the
Continental Congress in 1776 as the state of "Westsylvania."'1 79 Es-
sentially, they claimed that being remote from the seat of government
undermined their rights as a free people. Moreover, "having imbibed
the highest and most extensive Ideas of Liberty," they claimed they
possessed the right to establish a constitution and state responsive to
their needs.' 80 In the end, Congress simply ignored their petition and
the area later became part of Augusta County in Virginia.
Another trans-Appalachian effort to form a new state arose in an
area claimed by North Carolina in what is now Tennessee. Settlers in
that area also justified their need for separation by their isolation, in
this case, from North Carolina's government. In 1784, settlers drafted
a declaration of independence and a constitution for a proposed state
of "Franklin" that largely drew from the existing North Carolina con-
stitution. The declaration asserted that since the preservation of life,
liberty, property, and happiness hinged on separation, they had the
"duty and inalienable right" to form themselves into a new and in-
dependent state.'8' They articulated the source of the authority for
their actions in the first section of their bill of rights: "That all polit-
ical power is vested in and derived from the people."'1 Interestingly,
the convention submitted the constitution for the "serious considera-
tion of the people" for six months. 3 Thereafter, another convention
would gather for the "express purpose of adopting it in the name of
the people.' 8 4 Even in this constitution, which ultimately came to
naught because Congress chose not to undermine North Carolina's
claims, the constitution-makers identified themselves as embodying
the people. That self-perception proved easier to sustain when the
people could express their wishes or even send delegates to a second
convention.
179. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 94; BARNHART, supra note 177, at 49-51.
180. GEORGE H. ALDEN, NEW GOVERNMENTS WEST OF THE ALLEGHANIES BEFORE
1780, at 66 (Madison, Wis., 1897).
181. 9 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 127; see also THOMAS P. ABERNETHY, WESTERN
LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 288-310 (1937); BARNHART, supra note 177, at
61-65; WILLIAM BREWSTER, THE FOURTEENTH COMMONWEALTHS: VERMONT AND THE
STATES THAT FAILED 175-218 (1960).
182. 9 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 128.
183. Id. at 135.
184. Id
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The future admission of states into the Union, particularly from
the western frontier, clearly posed both ticklish political questions as
well as new constitutional definitions of "the people" in the process of
drafting constitutions. 185 Congress, prompted by the early clamor for
new states independent of the original colonies, sought to address the
issue in 1787 with the Northwest Ordinance.186 The Ordinance sought
to quantify when people became a people. Congress decreed that
5,000 adult free men in a given territory had a valid claim to elect a
legislature. 187 Moreover, such a territory could apply for statehood
and "be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and state govern-
ment" when its inhabitants numbered 60,000.188 Congress granted an
exception for territories with less than 60,000 inhabitants if "consistent
with the general interests" of the country.189
Even in states whose prior colonial status avoided the necessity of
identifying where "a people" came from, they still needed to decide
which of the people could exercise popular control. Eighteenth cen-
tury Americans were familiar with the classical distinction between a
people (who shared in the moral life of the community) and a public
(who participated in governance). Early constitution-makers often as-
sociated "the people" with the electorate for purposes of constitution-
making, although they sometimes expanded that definition signifi-
cantly beyond eligible voters. 190 Even if defined as the voters, a sec-
ondary question surfaced as to how many voters were needed to speak
for "the people." Did a simple numerical majority of the voters con-
stitute the voice of the people or should numbers be balanced by
other values, such as property interests? The divisive issue of majori-
tarianism-a debate that only fully emerged in the nineteenth cen-
185. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 96; Dennison, supra note 95.
186. See supra note 170.
187. See FREDERICK E. HOSEN, UNFOLDING WESTWARD IN TREATY AND LAW: LAND
DocuMENTS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY FROM THE APPALACHIANS TO THE PACIFIC,
1783-1934, at 37 (1988). For an in-depth study of territorial constitution-making, see John
W. Smurr, Territorial Constitutions: A Legal History of the Frontier Governments Erected
by Congress in the American West, 1787-1900 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indi-
ana University).
188. HOSEN, supra note 187, at 37.
189. Id. at 40.
190. See CoNKN, supra note 11, at 60; Celia, supra note 125, at 996; Schmidt, supra note
120, at 64; Taylor, supra note 126, at 321, 345; see also Donald S. Lutz, Political Participa-
tion in Eighteenth Century America, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST 19 (Paul Finkelman &
Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early
American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1989).
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tury-thus began to manifest itself in the eighteenth century in
deciding who the people were.19'
D. How Should Constitutional Change Occur?
Another issue also made its appearance in the course of early
constitution-making: How could constitutional change occur? More
specifically, did the people have an inherent right to make changes?
Related to the manner and source of constitutional revision were the
issues of the frequency and ease of revision.
Those who favored a more expansive view of popular sovereignty
insisted on the inherent right of the people to revise constitutions and
often referred to phrases advocating popular sovereignty that had
been included in many early bills of rights. Such statements had been
expressed previously and more famously by Thomas Jefferson in the
Declaration of Independence, where he wrote that the people had an
inalienable right "to alter or to abolish" their governments whenever
they become destructive of their legitimate ends. Jefferson's words
were characterized as an assertion of the people's right of revolution
based on natural law because they called the people to action in de-
fense of their inalienable rights. Whatever the intellectual sources of
the Declaration of Independence, 192 the people's right to take action
was definitively cast in that document as the last ditch effort of an
oppressed people-the way Americans saw themselves in 1776.
Scholars have been led astray by assuming that statements of
popular sovereignty often inserted in eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury state constitutions were essentially comparable to the right of
revolution enunciated by Jefferson. 93 From the start, American con-
191. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 134; GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 133-34 (1993); Sung Hui Kim, "We (the Supermajority of)
the People": The Development of a Rationale for Written Higher Law in North American
Constitutions, 137 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 364 (1993); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth
Century Constitution As a Basis for Protecting Personal Liberty, in CONSTITUTION AND
RIGHTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 48 (William E. Nelson & Robert C. Palmer eds., 1987).
192. The intellectual origins of Jefferson's Declaration have frequently been linked to
John Locke. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (1922); MoSTov, supra note 11, at 67; Goldstein, supra note 122, at 51,
57 Even those who challenge the Lockean influence on Jefferson describe his invocation
of the people's right "to alter or to abolish" as a "natural right of revolution" deriving from
the precedent of England's Glorious Revolution of 1688. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 89, 238 (1978).
193. See SUBER, supra note 27, at 228-31; Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural
Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE LJ. 907 (1993); Michael J. Horan, The Wyo-
ming Constitution: A Centennial Assessment, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 13, 20 (1991);
Joseph W. Little & Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of the Florida Declaration of Rights, 22
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stitution-makers invariably acknowledged the right of the sovereign
people of a state to invoke revolution. But they also began to lay the
foundation for a constitutional right of revision possessed by the peo-
ple that did not require a pre-condition of near revolutionary crisis.
Indeed, earlier political thinkers who exerted great influence in
America advocated non-Lockean formulations of popular sovereignty
that clearly invited the possibility of more routine reconsideration of
the governmental structure. 194 Such a right would later be character-
ized as a constitutional right unique to Americans. All peoples had
the natural right of revolution, but only Americans possessed the in-
herent right of legitimate constitutional revision that rested on the
popular sovereignty that formed the basis of American republics. 95
The version of popular sovereignty that evolved in state constitu-
tions clearly expanded the basis upon which the people could act and
impliedly gave support for a wide-range of options for doing so. Some
of the earliest state constitutions partially echoed the pre-conditions
for action suggested by the Declaration of Independence. For exam-
ple, Virginia's 1776 Constitution spoke of the people's rights when
government proved "inadequate" or acted "contrary" to its rightful
purposes. 96 Moreover, Maryland's 1776 Constitution identified the
people's right to reform "whenever the ends of government are per-
verted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means
STETsoN L. REV. 549 (1993); Tom N. McInnis, Natural Law and the Revolutionary State
Constitutions, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 351 (1990); Arvel Ponton III, Sources of Liberty in the
Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 93, 95, 102-03 (1988); Lawrence Schlam, State
Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in
Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 269,337 n.238 (1994); Torke, supra note 27,
at 241-43.
194. For example, Algernon Sidney argued that the exercise of popular sovereignty al-
ways provided the people with a right to change the governmental form in accordance with
changes of "times and things" and to "meet when and where, and dispose of sovereignty as
they will." CONKIN, supra note 11, at 21. Moreover, in the Putney Debates (Oct. 28, 1647),
one speaker presumed "'that all the people, and all nations whatsoever, have a liberty and
power to alter and change their constitutions if they find them to be weak and infirm."'
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTrUTiONALSM
AND DEMOCRACY 195, 199 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). For the impact of
Algernon Sidney among revolutionary and subsequent generations of Americans, particu-
larly those inclined to be a "radical, rebel, or revolutionary," see Caroline Robbins, Alger-
non Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government: Textbook of Revolution, 4 WM. & MARY
Q. 267, 295 (1947).
195. Delegates came to call this "the great American doctrine." 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF
THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4, 1853,
TO REVIsE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
138 (Boston, White & Potter 1853).
196. VA. CONST. of 1776, bill of rights, § 3, reprinted in 10 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at
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of redress are ineffectual. '197 Relatively soon, however, state consti-
tutions typically incorporated language that justified constitutional re-
vision on less urgent grounds. For example, Massachusetts's 1780
Constitution declared the people's right "to reform, alter, or totally
change" government whenever the people's "protection, safety, pros-
perity, and happiness require it."198 Delaware's 1792 Constitution an-
ticipated that the people, in order "to advance their happiness," would
change their government "as circumstances require, from time to
time. 1
9 9
Increasingly, as new states were formed and new constitutions
framed in the early nineteenth century, bills of rights announced the
people's right "at all times" to alter, reform or abolish their govern-
ments.20 0 This linguistic shift clearly signaled an expectation that con-
stitutional change remained in the hands of the people without the
necessity of dire circumstances that underlay the American Revolu-
tion. Moreover, it marked a distinct contrast from the Federal Consti-
tution's structural impediments to constitutional change. Although
many constitution-makers were split over the prospect of the ease of
constitutional reform, by the 1820s pressure had mounted for institu-
tionalizing the right of ongoing constitutional revision. The manifesta-
tion of that pressure took the form of a widespread trend in
constitutional conventions to include constitutional amendment provi-
sions in constitutions drafted or revised in the 1820s and 1830s.
If state constitutions from the revolutionary period demonstrated
an expanding basis for constitutional change, they had also suggested
a broad means of doing so. The concept of an inherent right of revi-
sion had implied, from the start of American constitution-making, that
197. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 372.
Even Maryland's constitution, however, emphasized that those in government were public
servants only holding power as trustees of the people and urged nonresistance to arbitrary
government and oppression.
198. MASS. CONST. of 1780, declaration of rights, art. VII, reprinted in 5 SWINDLER,
supra note 119, at 94.
199. DEL. CONST. of 1792, preamble, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 205.
200. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note
119, at 553; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 365;
-Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 5 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 348; CONN.
CONSr. of 1818, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 144; ALA. CONsT. of
1819, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 1 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 31. Note also that Maine's
1819 Constitution spoke of allowing the people's right to revise "when their safety and
happiness require it." ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note
119, at 314. Missouri's 1820 Constitution spoke in terms of the right "whenever it may be
necessary to [the people's] safety and happiness." Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 2, re-
printed in 5 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 487.
Winter 19971 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 341
even without revision provisions, the people still retained such a right.
Moreover, the inherent right arguably left the people with the discre-
tion to bypass such procedures even if articulated in a constitution.
Quite often, the inherent right of revision statements in state constitu-
tions ended with language stating the right could be invoked in such
manner as the people saw fit.2 '
The logic of the declaration-derived as it was from popular sov-
ereignty-thus suggested to some constitution-makers that the people
retained a paramount right to effect constitutional change. James Wil-
son, in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention for the Federal Constitu-
tion, broached this idea by describing the consequences of popular
sovereignty in America: "'the people may change the constitution
whenever and however they please[, this being] a right of which no
positive institution can ever deprive them.' 20 2 The congressional de-
bates over the admission of new states from the late eighteenth and
the early nineteenth centuries clearly drew upon "the belief that
American majorities had the inalienable right to change governments
at will.",20 3 Indeed, by the 1820s, the view became "quite prevalent"
that "the people alone had the right to promulgate the organiclaw.,,)204
Those taking a more passive view of popular sovereignty dis-
agreed. They took the position, increasingly elaborated and empha-
sized in the course of the nineteenth century, that change ought (and
perhaps could only) occur within authorized procedures. When their
opponents cited the people's right to "alter or abolish" government as
justifying unconstrained constitutional revision, they replied that such
201. Virginia's 1776 Constitution declared the right could be invoked "in such manner
as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." VA. CONST. of 1776, bill of rights,
§ 3, reprinted in 10 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 49. Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution
spoke of the people's right to alter their government "in such manner as they may think
proper." PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 2, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 292.
Similar language was found in many other state constitutions. See TENN. CONST. of 1796,
art. I, § 1, reprinted in 9 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 152; Ky. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 2,
reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 162; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 2, reprinted
in 3 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 365; Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 5
SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 348; CoNN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 2 SWIN-
DLER, supra note 119, at 144; ArA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 1 SWINDLER,
supra note 119, at 31.
202. Amar, supra note 73, at 474 (quoting James Wilson).
203. Dennison, supra note 95, at 19, 23.
204. GREEN, supra note 127, at 203. Indeed, objections were raised to the possibility of
a periodic call for constitutional conventions in Indiana's 1816 Constitution on the ground
that it impliedly threatened the people's inherent right to call a convention between those
times. See Ruth E. Brayton, The Constitution of 1816, at 208 (1929) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Indiana University).
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language only represented a theoretical statement of popular sover-
eignty. Moreover, opponents of constitutional change insisted on a
pre-condition of dire circumstances and "sought to characterize re-
form as a revolutionary movement. 20 5
Constitution-makers also differed over the benefits and dangers
inherent in more frequent revision, and to a lesser extent the relative
ease of change. Those embracing a broader view of popular sover-
eignty advanced the revolutionary principle that the preservation of
republican governments required a "frequent recurrence to funda-
mental principles." American familiarity with the principle came
from political thinkers who had posited that "'all human Constitutions
are subject to Corruption and must perish, unless they are timely re-
newed by reducing them to their first Principles.' 20 6 This injunction
205. Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., The Conservative Use of History in Early National Virginia,
19 S. SrUD. 128, 134, 138, 145 (1980).
Abraham Lincoln in his first inaugural address epitomized the position for a passive
version of popular sovereignty in the context of the Federal Constitution. Lincoln deliber-
ately asserted an either/or choice between revolution and constitutional amendment under
Article V. See 4 COLLECrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 269 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953-
1955). Prior to the Civil War, however, Lincoln had expressed a version of the right of
revolution not only in more sympathetic terms, but without a pre-condition of dire circum-
stances. In 1848, in the midst of conflict between the United States and Mexico over Texas,
Lincoln asserted:
Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise
up, and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them
better. This is a most valuable,--a most sacred right-a right, which we hope and
believe, is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the
whole people of an existing government, may chose to exercise it. Any portion of
such people that can, may revolutionize, and make their own, of so much of the
territory as they inhabit. More than this, a majority of any portion of such people
may revolutionize, putting down a minority, intermingled with, or near them, who
may oppose their movement.
1 id. at 438. By the summer of 1861, however, Lincoln's description underwent considera-
ble change.
The right of revolution, is never a legal right. The very term implied the breaking,
and not the abiding by, organic law. At most, it is but a moral right, when exer-
cised for a morally justifiable cause. When exercised without such a cause revolu-
tion is no right, but simply a wicked exercise of physical power.
4 id. at 434. For the ways in which the advent of the Civil War transformed understandings
about its revolutionary nature, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-42 (1990).
The debate over the admission of new states also reveals a split between those who
"insisted that American majorities had the right to create or change a government at will"
and those who "believed as fervently that the forms had to be observed." Dennison, supra
note 95, at 19, 22, 24.
206. Quoted in WooD, supra note 21, at 34; see also STOURZH, supra note 12, at 34-37.
Stourzh points out that "first principles" in eighteenth century parlance could mean the
natural law fundamentals of political society, as well as the earliest or first ideas in a histor-
ical sense, which were susceptible to decay over time. See id. at 10-11.
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stemmed from a belief that republican government rested on the vir-
tue of the people who, by avoiding vice and corruption, might post-
pone the inevitable decline of all governments.20 7 Recurring to the
integrity of ideas that underlay government was a step in the right
direction. Nonetheless, as drawn from these pre-revolutionary writ-
ers, such a conception of a "frequent recurrence" was incompatible
with the modern idea of constitutional revision because all govern-
ments were deemed subject to natural decline. 08 The best a "fre-
quent recurrence" to first principles might do was to stave off the
inevitable.
With the American Revolution, however, the principle gradually
assumed a significantly different purpose, one linked to popular sover-
eignty and the role of the people in government. As Willi Paul Adams
observed:
Having shifted the source of legitimate government from the
grace of God to the sovereignty of the people was not enough to
avoid a cycle of oppression and revolution. The people had to
insist on a permanent role and be ready to intervene in the polit-
ical process before it came to a violent halt.209
Thus, the "frequent recurrence" declaration in early constitutions was
no mere "moralistic rhetorical appeal" but a serious reminder of the
importance of timely reforms of the constitutional system. The bills of
rights for the first constitutions of Virginia, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as for New Hampshire's
second constitution, all proclaimed the importance of such a "recur-
rence" to preserving republics. 1° The preservation of republics de-
pended on maintaining public and private virtue, and one means of
doing so was to keep the implications and importance of "fundamen-
tal principles" alive in the minds of the people. But equally important
207. See POCOCK, supra note 57, at 462-552; WOOD, supra note 21, at 65-70.
208. See Pocock, supra note 57, at 75-80.
209. ADAMS, supra note 19, at 142-43; see also Peterson, THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 67, at 275-93. But see Kenyon, supra note 85, at 84-121 (regarding the phrase "fre-
quent recurrence" in early state constitutions to be more a reminder to the people of the
ethical and aspirational goals of government rather than an invitation to the people to take
a more active role in changing government).
210. See VA. DECLARATION of RIGHTS of 1776, § 15, reprinted in 10 SWINDLER, supra
note 119, at 50; N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 21, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note
119, at 403; PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 14, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra
note 119, at 279; VT. DECLARATION OR RIGHTS of 1777, § 16, reprinted in 9 SWINDLER,
supra note 119, at 490; MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1780, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5
SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 95; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, § 38, reprinted in 6 SWIN-
DLER, supra note 119, at 347; see also ADAMS, supra note 19, at 142-,4; STOURZH, supra
note 12, at 9-37; Orth, supra note 124.
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was their participation in ongoing revision and formal constitutional
adjustment.21'
Insisting on regular and frequent consideration of constitutional
issues ultimately implied a more encompassing view of popular sover-
eignty because it linked positive benefits to the potentially destabi-
lizing process of reconsidering the constitution. Pennsylvania's first
constitution responded to this constitutional principle by incorporat-
ing a revision mechanism that dated back to classical Greek and Ro-
man times. The constitution provided for the meeting of a Council of
Censors in 1783 and every seven years thereafter.212 Its standing in-
quiry was whether "the constitution has been preserved inviolate in
every part" and whether "the legislative and executive branches of the
government have performed their duty as guardians of the people. '213
The Council could call a convention to meet within two years of their
septennial meeting given "an absolute necessity of amending any arti-
cle of the constitution which may be defective, explaining such as may
be thought not clearly expressed, and of adding such as are necessary
for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people. '214
Two persons from each city and county composed the council, a two-
thirds vote of which was needed for a convention.21 5
The council's monitoring of constitutional government thus
served a dual function, namely, to correct potential abuses as well as
to facilitate modifications deemed necessary with experience and the
passage of time. The periodic nature of the council epitomized the
stated principle that a "frequent recurrence" was "absolutely neces-
sary to preserve the blessings of liberty. '21 6 Beyond specifying a pro-
cess for constitutional revision, the system of the Council of Censors
also gave them a positive, ongoing role in preserving republican
government.
Not everyone embraced such a notion of "frequent recurrence."
To those inclined to favor a more passive description of popular sover-
eignty, a "frequent recurrence" threatened to undermine governmen-
211. A petition from Albemarle County lauded the Declaration of Rights of Virginia's
1776 Constitution, but raised a series of objections, among the most important being the
absence of a regular mode of assembling the people to make changes in government. See
Howard, supra note 149, at 828.
212. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 285.
213. Id. For the theory behind the Council of Censors, see Lutz, supra note 7, at 129-
49.
214. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 285.
215. See id.
216. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 14, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note
119, at 279.
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tal stability rather than preserve it.217 Underlying the resistance to the
principle was the relative degree of faith in the people's capacity to
exercise popular sovereignty. In some respects, John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson represented the division between those who pos-
sessed varying degrees of trust in the people. Adams retained a dis-
trust of the common man and did not share Jefferson's "cherishment"
and faith in the capacity of the people to act in their best interests.218
Ultimately, some such underlying faith formed an important part of
the calculus among those who asserted a wider view of popular
sovereignty.21 9
Those questioning the capacity of the people to achieve responsi-
ble changes tended to worry about vested property rights and sought
to limit the people's involvement in government, constitution-making,
and revision. On the other hand, other constitution-makers expressed
far greater confidence in the people. They, too, wished to avoid tran-
sient changes, but were more comfortable with the regular involve-
ment of the people in the process of constitutional revision. Rather
than constraining popular participation because it might prove unset-
tling, some even accepted a degree of political "excitement" as the
price of republican institutions. A few even touted the benefits of re-
newed commitment that a vigorous debate over constitutional princi-
ples might bring. Underlying this perception of revision was a belief
217. See PETERSON, supra note 113, at 11-12. The resistance of Federalists, including
James Madison, to future federal constitutional conventions was indicative of such fears.
See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 110, at 223; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 43, 49 (James
Madison); KAMMEN, supra note 121, at 58; KOCH, supra note 67, at 62-96; LASH, supra note
113, at 209, 223; Holmes, supra note 194, at 215-18; Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, supra note
67, at 286; Douglas G. Voegler, Amending the Constitution by the Article V Convention
Method, 55 N.D. L. REv. 355, 355-408 (1979); see also Bruce, supra note 205; John W.
Malsberger, The Political Thought of Fisher Ames, 2 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 1, 1-20 (1982).
218. See Joyce Appleby, Introduction: Jefferson and His Complex Legacy, in JEFFERSO-
NIAN LEGACIES supra note 67, at 1, 12 (citing letter from Jefferson to Adams in 1823).
Likewise, a split in confidence of the people also existed between Madison and Jefferson.
See McCoy, supra note 31, at 70-73; Holmes, supra note 194, at 216-18; Levinson, supra
note 7, at 2445-53.
For more on Jefferson's faith in the people, see John L. Larson, Jefferson's Union and
the Problem of Internal Improvements, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES, supra note 67, at 340,
346; Gordon S. Wood, The Trials and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson, in JEFFERSONIAN
LEGACIES supra note 67, at 385, 407 (noting Jefferson's "absolute faith" in the people).
219. There was, of course, an early recognition that the promise of republicanism rested
upon a virtuous, educated citizenry. See WooD, supra note 21, at 65-70. Moreover, theo-
retical and philosophical questions of the nature of American constitutionalism frequently
played against a backdrop of substantive political concerns and issues. Nonetheless, Amer-
ican constitution-makers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries spent considerable
time seriously exploring the theoretical nature and practical implications of the principle of
popular sovereignty.
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that the people retained an active role in guarding the meaning of
constitutions.
Some opponents of "a frequent recurrence" stressed the impor-
tance of stability and permanence as core values that were threatened
by an enlarged view of popular sovereignty that encouraged recurring
constitutional change. Instead, they favored constitutional adjust-
ments effected by the judiciary rather than through formal constitu-
tional revision. Rejecting Jefferson's call for a "continual
reassessment" of government by "the governed," they could find sol-
ace in the Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison.220 Chief
Justice John Marshall's assumption of judicial review constituted a
welcome alternative to the destabilizing potential of revising the Fed-
eral Constitution.22 ' For Jefferson, however, Marshall's desire to judi-
cially adapt the Federal Constitution undercut the people's security in
formally changing the document. Such an approach converted the
Federal Constitution, in Jefferson's eyes, into "'a blank paper by
construction.'222
This desire to see the people more actively involved in ongoing
constitutional revision was linked to a reluctant acceptance of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the Constitution. Historian Phil-
lip Paludan has reminded us that only after the Civil War did the as-
sumption that the Supreme Court was the natural, final interpreter of
the Federal Constitution gather momentum. 223 Indeed, the challenges
220. 5 U.S. 118 (1 Cranch 137) (1803). For Hamilton's anticipation of judicial review,
see STOURZH, supra note 12, at 56-63.
221. See Edmond Cahn, An American Contribution, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME
LAW, supra note 75, at 1, 20-25 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1968).
In Marbury, Marshall stressed the people's "original right" to establish government as
"the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected." 5 U.S. at 136. Conspic-
uously absent, though, was any reference to some direct, ongoing role for the people in
changing their government. John Vile has described the history of Article V of the Federal
Constitution as "a constant tension" between those who have emphasized the need for
formal change and. those who have stressed "judicial adaptation." Vile, supra note 109, at
67.
In anticipating judicial interpretation of the Federal Constitution, Alexander Hamil-
ton's characterization of judicial review as effectuating the supreme will of the people as
declared in the Constitution (rather than being a mark of judicial supremacy) rested on a
relatively static notion of the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Ham-
ilton). The "people" had spoken in terms of the Constitution, but they had no ongoing role
in developing its meaning.
222. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 67, at 284 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
223. See Phillip Shaw Paludan, Hercules Unbound: Lincoln, Slavery, and the Intentions
of the Framers, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992); see also HAR-
OLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFcr UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
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to the national government represented by the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions (1798-1799), the Hartford Convention (1814-1815), and
the Nullification Crisis (1831-1833), had in common their accusation
of federal "tyranny." Though traditionally considered part of the
struggle to define American federalism, those episodes hinged on a
perceived lack of federal constitutional authority. Explicitly, these in-
stances of resistance to, if not defiance of, federal authority denied the
United States Supreme Court a monopoly on determining the consti-
tutionality of the national government's actions.224
In the end, those who shared Marshall's views relied on the rule
of law in general, and the role of judges in particular, as the principal
means of protecting property and controlling the potentially rambunc-
tious voice of the people. Chancellor James Kent, a delegate to New
York's 1821 constitutional convention, epitomized how suspicion of
the people led to a preference for a judicial monopoly over constitu-
tional matters. For Kent there was "a constant tendency in human
society" for "the poor to covet and to share the plunder of the rich; in
the debtor to relax or avoid the obligation of contracts; in the majority
to tyrannize over the minority, and trample down their rights. '"215 All
that checked this universal tendency was "a vigilant government, and
a firm administration of justice."" 6 The issues of judicial indepen-
dence and the judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation
arose most pointedly in later state constitutional debates on the ques-
tion of whether the judiciary should be elected or appointed. That
debate clearly reflected the desire and the dread with which different
delegates reacted to assertions that the people should assume greater
control over the meaning of constitutionalism.
STRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1973); Larson, supra note 218, at 356; Moore, supra
note 92, at 315.
Even though he concedes "special constitutional responsibility" for the Supreme
Court to interpret the Federal Constitution as part of "the necessary logic of popular sover-
eignty," Conkin insists that under the theory of popular sovereignty, only the people have
"a final power to determine what is or is not constitutional." CoNIN, supra note 11, at 67,
71.
224. Indeed, when several legislatures responded to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolu-
tions, they explicitly identified the United States Supreme Court as the final interpreter of
the Federal Constitution. See Goldstein, supra note 122, at 51, 67; David Zarefsky & Vic-
toria J. Gallagher, From "Conflict" to "Constitutional Question": Transformations in Early
American Public Discourse, 76 QJ. SPEECH 247, 252 (1990).
225. L.H. CLARKE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK; HELD AT THE CAPITAL, IN THE CITY OF ALBANY, ON THE
28TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1821, at 221 (New York, J. Seymour 1821).
226. Id
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E. Were There Limits to Constitutional Change?
The final issue that stemmed from popular sovereignty received
only peripheral attention in the earliest period of constitution-making,
but became a central concern of later nineteenth century constitution-
makers. Were there limits to constitutional revision, either in terms of
what substantively might be included in constitutions or in the proce-
dure of effecting constitutional change? Some scholars have noted
that drafters of the earliest bills of rights anticipated the notion that
natural law protected certain inalienable rights from interference by
the majority.227 While the battles over majoritarianism lay ahead in
the nineteenth century, some eighteenth century constitution-makers
also confronted the issue of substantive limits on constitutional revi-
sion in the context of federalism. The Federal Constitution's injunc-
tion that Congress "guarantee" republican governments in the United
States"28 raised questions not only about defining republicanism, but
also about the incompatibility of "unrepublican" features in newly-
created state constitutions.229 Another source of substantive restraint
on state constitutions, which was crystallized by the Civil War, came in
the form of acknowledging the supremacy of the Federal Constitution
and repudiating secession and nullification. Procedural limits took the
familiar form of denying the people's supposed unfettered right to re-
vise constitutions, and permitting them to do so only in strict accord-
ance with authorized procedures.
The broader context of state constitution-making in new territo-
ries also raised the question of potential limitations on both the pro-
cess and substance of constitution-making. Of what significance was
the requirement under enabling acts for new state constitutions to at-
tain congressional approval? 3 ° In other words, did the absence of
popular ratification of constitutions framed under an enabling act im-
ply a different understanding of popular sovereignty in the context of
such territorial state-making? If Congress, and not the inhabitants of
the territory, needed to ratify a constitution and might insist on spe-
cific provisions, what did that suggest about the nature of sovereignty
exercised in the creation of such constitutions? Arguably, the lack of
popular ratification went beyond the fact that Congress played an in-
227. See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 144-47; see also, CoNKIN, supra note 11, at 119-28.
228. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
229. See Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little SaiL The Evolution of American State
Constitutions, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST, supra note 190, at 388, 392.
230. Kermit Hall raised the question of how the necessity of congressional approval
shaped constitutional development. See Hall, supra note 229, at 392; see also, Smurr, supra
note 187.
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tegral role in the statehood process, but constitution-making in the
territories also drew from understandings about the nature and power
of constitutional conventions in promulgating constitutions. From
such a perspective, Congressional approval could be regarded merely
as an important formality made necessary by federalism. The context
of constitution-making against the backdrop of congressional over-
sight continued to raise issues of how the expression of popular sover-
eignty might be fettered.
Inherent in the issue of limitations on revision was the ongoing
paradox of popular sovereignty: If the people were truly sovereign,
how could one generation limit later ones? 31 Ultimately, the efficacy
of such limitations proved independent of the desire or incentive to
insert such limits. Moreover, the struggle over limitations raised the
issue of sources of constitutional authority outside of a written consti-
tution. Since constitutions rested on the authority of the people, could
natural law outside of constitutions check or limit them? Underlying
this question was a struggle between those who sought to insulate
property interests and those who wanted to affect property in the
name of public regulation.
The broad debate over the issues underlying popular sovereignty
produced competing characterizations: theoretical abstraction versus
practical political principle. Those favoring an abstract statement
tended to insist upon adherence to established provisions for constitu-
tional change. Their opponents, however, argued that popular sover-
eignty meant that the people could invoke an inherent right to alter or
abolish their constitutions independent of established procedures or
legislative authority.
The continuing resonance that a broader view of popular sover-
eignty had for constitution-makers is well illustrated by revisions to
existing constitutions. In many respects this phase proved especially
insightful because it entailed more "mature" experiences than the ini-
tial efforts at framing constitutions. Thus, the status of ideas and ex-
pansive views of popular sovereignty in this later period are especially
useful because they emerged from an America experienced with con-
stitution-making. In particular, the preambles to these constitutions,
the statements of popular sovereignty, the revision provisions in the
text, and the practice of popular ratification offer important insights
231. For the intellectual origins of the paradox and its resultant tension between majori-
tarianism and constitutional limits on majorities, see Holmes, supra note 194, at 195-240.
Jefferson, for one, specifically rejected that "'one generation of men has the right to bind
another."' Id. at 203 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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into how those constitution-makers understood conventions and pop-
ular sovereignty.
Later efforts at constitutional changes, unlike the initial creation
of constitutions through legislatures, all involved constitutional con-
ventions. Thus, when the Georgia conventions meeting in 1789 and
1798 included preambles, their language of self-perception, that is, of
their power and of their purpose, bears noting. In 1789 they called
themselves "delegates from the people, in convention met" who could
"ratify and confirm" the present constitution "by virtue of the powers
in us vested for that purpose. ''2 32 Nine years later, their draft constitu-
tion stated that as the "delegates of the people of the State of Geor-
gia, chosen and authorized by them to revise, alter or amend" the
constitution they, therefore, ratified their present work as the new
constitution.23 Likewise, delegates to New York's 1801 constitutional
convention, after enumerating the changes they were making to the
1777 Constitution, referred to their assembled purpose: to ordain the
present document as New York's new constitution "in the name and
by the authority of the people of this state."'21
In the bills of rights for these revised constitutions, the pattern of
statements of popular sovereignty and the need for a frequent recur-
rence to fundamental principles roughly continued as it had in the ear-
liest constitutions. In some cases, as in Pennsylvania's 1790
Constitution, the expression received an even broader and more radi-
cal articulation. Likewise, while New Hampshire's 1776 Constitution
lacked any statement about popular sovereignty, the state's second
constitution in 1784 not only identified the inherent power of the peo-
ple as the basis of government, but further specified the conditions
under which the people would invoke that power. After explaining
the proper objects of government, the bill of rights declared that
"whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty
manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual,
the people may, and of right ought to, reform the old, or establish a
new government. '235 Furthermore, the provision described the "doc-
trine of non-resistance against arbitrary power, and oppression" as
"absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of man-
kind." 6 Such echoes of a more expansionist view of popular sover-
232. GA. CONSr. of 1789, preamble, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 452.
233. GA. CONST. of 1798, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 466.
234. N.Y. CONST. of 1801, reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 180.
235. N.H. CONST. of 1784, § 10, reprinted in 6 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 345.
236. Id.
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eignty continued through the end of the eighteenth century and well
into the nineteenth century.
The provisions for constitutional revision and change in the con-
stitutions framed by subsequent conventions are also revealing. Con-
ventions that produced a second, or in some cases a third, state
constitution illustrate the earliest widespread pattern of inserting pro-
visions for constitutional amendment. Moreover, even if popular sov-
ereignty implied a right of the people to gather in a convention and
revise their governments, this second wave of constitution-making
also saw an increased attention to establishing both the possibility and
the mechanics of holding future conventions. Ironically, this greater
specification of procedures for amendment and revision eventually
had the effect of giving opponents of a more expansive view of popu-
lar sovereignty ammunition in their efforts to constrain the role of the
people in constitutional revision. At the very least, specific mecha-
nisms for amendment and revision raised the question of their effect
on the broad statements of the people's inherent right to "alter or
abolish" their governments.237
The emerging pattern with respect to constitutional amendments
took the form of requiring legislatively initiated constitutional change
that became valid without formal ratification. The constitutions of
South Carolina (1790), Delaware (1792), and Georgia (1798), for ex-
ample, all followed this approach. The typical provision called for
successive votes of two legislatures (usually of two-thirds, but some-
times three-fourths vote) with a distinct interval during which the peo-
ple could react to proposed changes. The provisions usually required
"publicity" or at least "publication" of the proposed changes." s
Georgia's 1798 Constitution mandated that suggested changes be pub-
lished at least six months prior to the general election of the second
legislature.239
With respect to future conventions, the second wave of constitu-
tional revision displayed another pattern of more frequently specify-
ing how and when such future conventions might meet. Georgia's
1789 Constitution provided that each county would send three dele-
237. Such an implication was raised in 1780 when the Town of Roxbury, Massachusetts
advocated a formalized means of constitutional revision so that "the people might recur to
first principles in a Regular Way, without hazarding a Revolution in the Government."
POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 162, at 793.
238. See, eg., S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. XI, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at
481-82 (speaking of "publicity"); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. X, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER,
supra note 119, at 214 (speaking of "publication").
239. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 15, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 466.
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gates to a convention in 1794 and only proceed to consider revisions if
the delegates agreed by two-thirds vote that alterations were neces-
sary.240 Kentucky's 1792 Constitution, however, placed the issue of
another convention before the people in 1797, providing that one
would be held if a majority of the electorate agreed in two successive
years.241 However, if such majorities were not attained, the provision
still permitted a convention if two-thirds of the legislature agreed. 2
Delaware's 1792 Constitution provided a variation by making the peo-
ple the exclusive trigger for future conventions. It stated that an "un-
exceptional" means of doing so was to vote for a convention at
general elections.243 Those opposed to an expansive view of popular
sovereignty eventually could cite such specific procedures as the only
route to future conventions. Those in favor could note that those
same constitutions often retained statements of the inherent right of
the people to revise their governments.
The persistence of an expansive understanding of popular sover-
eignty and its relationship to constitutional revision by conventions
was also demonstrated by the general absence of popular ratification.
Between 1779 and 1801, eight different states revisited their original
constitutions by holding subsequent conventions. 244 Of the eight
240. See GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 7, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at
455.
241. See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XI, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 149.
The effort to create a constitution for Kentucky involved over ten conventions held from
1776 to 1792. See JOAN WELLS COWARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE PRO-
CESS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING (1979); LOWELL H. HARRISON, JOHN BRECKINRIDGE:
JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN, 93-113 (1.969); Pratt Byrd, The Kentucky Frontier in 1792, 25
FILSON CLUB HisT. Q. 181-203, 286-94 (1951); Ethelbert D. Warfield, The Constitutional
Aspects of Kentucky's Struggle for Autonomy, 1784-1792, in 4 PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 349, 349-65 (1890). James Madison also advised members of
the 1792 convention about how to draft their constitution. See Letter from James Madison
to Caleb Wallace (August 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49,
at 355-56.
Slavery had become a crucial issue before the 1792 convention met. Indeed, the Ken-
tucky Gazette during the 1780s had repeatedly proposed to constitutionally abolish slavery.
See Byrd, supra, at 193-94. Instead, the convention drafted a guarantee for slavery after a
motion to abolish slavery failed by a vote of 26 to 16. The controversy over slavery also
affected the provisions for future revision. Notwithstanding the declaration of the people's
inherent right of revision, the revision provision succeeded in staving off efforts to hold a
second convention before 1797. See George L. Willis, Sr., History of Kentucky Constitu-
tions and Constitutional Conventions, 28 REG. Ky. STATE HisT. SoC'Y 305 (1930); 29 REG.
Ky. STATE HIST. Soc'Y 52 (1931).
242. See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XI, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 149.
243. See DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. X, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 214.
244. Some of the states held more than a single convention during the period 1779-
1801: New Hampshire (1779, 1784, and 1792), Vermont (1786 and 1793), and Georgia
(1789 and 1798).
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states, only New Hampshire, which from the start had shared the prac-
tice with Massachusetts, submitted its constitution for formal ratifica-
tion.245 Thus, while Americans had come to accept the necessity of
using constituent assemblies of conventions to frame constitutions,
they clearly had not embraced the theoretical need for popular ratifi-
cation. Indeed, not only were second and third generation constitu-
tions promulgated, but their provisions for future constitutional
conventions were also silent about ratification. These delegates saw
themselves as appropriately exercising the sovereignty of the people
within the context of constitutional conventions. For the most part,
Americans agreed.
The most dramatic evidence of the persistence of an expansive
view of popular sovereignty arose when Americans circumvented ex-
isting procedures for constitutional change and invoked their inherent
powers. If conventions became the established mechanism for creat-
ing or revising constitutions relatively soon, their use left unresolved
who had the power to call them. Six of the first eleven colonies to
frame constitutions left the question open by not expressly addressing
the issue of future constitutional revision. Only three of the remain-
ing five were explicit about using constitutional conventions. Penn-
sylvania's 1776 Constitution put the issue of a future convention in the
hands of a Council that met every seven years and could call a conven-
tion after a two-thirds vote.246 Georgia's 1777 Constitution required a
majority of the voters in each county to petition for a convention, af-
ter which the legislature would call one.247 Finally, Massachusetts's
1780 Constitution provided for a two-thirds vote of the voters in 1795,
before another convention would be held.248 Even the existence of
future revision provisions, however, raised the question of their bind-
ing nature.
That issue directly arose in Pennsylvania in response to dissatis-
faction with the "radical" 1776 Constitution. Efforts by opponents of
that constitution were stymied by their inability to muster the two-
245. Georgia's 1789 Constitution, while not formally ratified, evidenced the concern
with public consultation, even if indirectly, by calling for a second convention to ratify the
work of the first convention.
246. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47, reprinted in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at 285.
Vermont followed this procedure in its 1777 Constitution and employed it well into the
nineteenth century, only abolishing the Council of Censors in 1870. See WILLIAM C. HILL,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VERMONT- A REFERENCE GuIDE 6-19 (1992).
247. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 119, at
449.
248. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. VI, art. X, reprinted in 5 SWINDLER, supra note 119,
at 108.
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thirds required vote of the Council before holding a new conven-
tion.249 Eventually, in defiance of the constitutional provision, the
legislature itself called for a convention in 1789, which drafted the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. Interestingly, this departure from
established constitutional procedures to effect constitutional revision
came about by conservatives frustrated by a state of affairs generated
by the "radical" constitution. Indeed, a similar reaction by the more
conservative voices had likewise circumvented the provisions for revi-
sion of the Articles of Confederation by calling the federal constitu-
tional convention and justifying their action based on popular
sovereignty.250 When the pre-eminent nineteenth century commenta-
tor on constitutional conventions, who opposed an expansive view of
popular sovereignty, considered the revision of Pennsylvania's 1776
Constitution, he reluctantly concluded that the origin of the 1789 con-
vention had been "wholly illegitimate. ' '251 The change of Penn-
sylvania's 1776 Constitution by "a constitutionally dubious agent" 52
ultimately rested on invoking the inherent power of people to revise
their constitutions. Indeed, an editorial in the Federal Gazette explic-
itly asserted the transcendent power of popular sovereignty to achieve
constitutional change outside of textual procedures: "This power of
electing a convention at all times, to alter the constitution of a state, is
[a] never dormant-never ceasing-uncontrollable right of the
people."" 3
249. See ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THm COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA,
1776-1790, at 18-38, 53-60, 156-63, 221-27 (1942); Ryerson, supra note 29, at 122-27.
250. See ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 173-74, 176. James Madison frankly conceded
that the call for a federal constitutional convention had been characterized as "extraconsti-
tutional." See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 24, 1787), in 9 Tm
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 294.
251. JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR His.
TORY, POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 216 (New York, De Capo Press 1872) (4th ed.
1887). Although he clearly sympathized with the constitutional reformers struggling
against the Council of Censors, Jameson concluded their method of constitutional change
involved a "flagrant usurpation" on the part of the legislature. 11L at 217. He denied that
action could not be justified "except by affirming the legal right of the inhabitants of a
given territory, organized as a body politic, to meet at will, as individuals, without the
authority of law, and, on their own claim that they are the people of the State, to dictate to
the government such changes in its laws, constitution, or policy, as they may deem desira-
ble." Id- Thus, for Jameson, departure from constitutional revision procedures rested on a
claim of the inherent right of the people to revise governments and implied a justification
of circumvention conventions.
252. Ryerson, supra note 29, at 130; see also Schmidt, supra note 120, at 24.
253. Herrington, supra note 33, at 605 (quoting editorial by "A Freeman," FEDERAL
GAZETM, March 27, 1789). The inherent right of "the sovereign people alone" to alter,
amend, or abolish their government was acknowledged by a committee of Pennsylvania's
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If those who sought to confine the scope of popular sovereignty
in the name of the people nonetheless occasionally resorted to its au-
thority to make constitutional changes outside of normal channels,
less conservative-minded individuals were even less reticent to invoke
popular sovereignty. Indeed, they proceeded to do so in far more dra-
matic ways including calling for constitutional conventions unauthor-
ized by legislatures. These "circumvention conventions" played an
important role in the nineteenth century.' 4 Justification of such con-
ventions squarely rested on a view of popular sovereignty that identi-
fied an inherent right in the people to assemble and effect legitimate
constitutional changes.
The political background to circumvention conventions was an
early nineteenth century reaction to the disparity in political represen-
tation typical of many early state constitutions. The western regions
of many states, though experiencing rapid growth, remained under-
represented in a constitutional apportionment formula that favored
the older eastern portions of the states. In North Carolina and Vir-
ginia, frustrated efforts at constitutional reform led to circumvention.
In 1816, citing the inherent right of the people to revise their govern-
ments, Virginia delegates gathered in what was known as the Staunton
Convention to initiate a constitutional convention that would revise
the existing fundamental law.255
The recurrence of circumvention techniques during the 1820s and
1830s in North Carolina, Maryland, Georgia, Virginia, and Penn-
sylvania not only reflected a degree of frustrated constitutional re-
form, but also illustrated the constitutional understanding that gave
the people a role in constitutional revision well outside of the estab-
lished procedures for constitutional change. 6 Even more important
legislature in 1805. See Roy H. Akagi, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838,48 PA. MAG.
HisT. 301, 304 (1924).
254. George Parkinson evidently coined the expression "circumvention convention" in
Antebellum State Constitution Making: Retention, Circumvention, Revision (1972) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
255. See GREEN, supra note 127, at 203-15; Parkinson, supra note 254, at 35-42; Robert
P. Sutton, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830: A Profile Analysis of Late
Jeffersonian Virginia 62-64 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
256. See William K. Boyd, The Antecedents of the North Carolina Convention of 1835,9
S. ArLAuc Q. 160 (1910); see also DEMOCRACY, LMERTY, AND PROPERTY, supra note 2,
at 3-17, 125-42, 271-85; GREEN, supra note 127, at 99-253; Fletcher M. Green, Cycles of
American Democracy, 48 Miss. VALLEY HisT. REV. 3, 10-11 (1978); James A. Henretta,
The Rise and Decline of" Democratic-Republicanism": Political Rights in New York and the
Several States, 1800-1915, 53 ALB. L. REv. 819 (1989); Parkinson, supra note 254; Schmidt,
supra note 120, at 97; Sutton, supra note 255, at 62, 64; Watson, supra note 90, at 19-42;
WESTERN CAROLINIAN (Salisbury, N.C.), Nov. 25, Dec. 2, 9, 23, & 30, 1823, Jan. 6, 1824.
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than actual circumvention conventions and direct action taken by the
people were the prevalent articulated justifications of such potential
action.257 Whether used by "outsiders" or conservatives under the
threat of domination by radicals, the notion of direct intervention by
the people remained alive in the constitutional discourse of the nine-
teenth century.
Conclusion
Between the Revolution and the 1830s, state constitutions and
those who framed and revised them willingly accepted the proposition
of inherent political power vested in the people. This proposition,
along with its concomitant implication of the people's right to change
their government or even abolish it, remained relatively uncontrover-
sial until some groups invoked those words to take constitutional revi-
sion into their own hands. Despite earlier episodes of circumvention
conventions, it was the Dorr Rebellion in 1841 that precipitated ex-
plicit debate on the validity of an expansive view of popular sover-
eignty. Thomas Dorr and his adherents in Rhode Island justified their
right to initiate constitutional revision outside the authority of the ex-
isting state government as consistent with the principle of popular sov-
ereignty. That principle, they argued, provided a constitutional
middle ground between revision authorized by existing governments
and constitutions and the ultimate right of revolution based on sheer
power.
In the aftermath of the Dorr Rebellion, opponents of the expan-
sive view of popular sovereignty, including the United States Supreme
Court, rejected such a constitutional middle ground. Their position
denied that the people had inherent rights of revision, and held that
constitutional revision could legitimately take place only as authorized
by existing governmental authorities and in compliance with estab-
lished procedures. Anything else, they argued, constituted revolution.
Such a view, of course, reflected the constrained version of popular
sovereignty embodied in the Federal Constitution, with its explicit and
rigid requirements for constitutional change.
257. See PETER J. GALIE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEw YoRK: A REFER-
ENCE GUIDE 96-97,279-81 (1991); GETrLEMAN, supra note 89, at 20; Boyd, supra note 256,
at 171; Howard, supra note 149, at 816, 846; Mumford, supra note 134, at 108; Sutton, supra
note 255, at 108; Proceedings of the Friends of Convention, at a Meeting Held in Raleigh,
December, 1822 (Raleigh, N.C., 1822), microformed on Records of the States of the United
States, Series C, Reel 2, Unit 1.
Winter 19971 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 357
If the Dorr Rebellion stimulated an explicit rebuttal and repudia-
tion of the expansive view of popular sovereignty drawn from state
constitutional practice, the Civil War put such views under extraordi-
nary pressure. After the War, those who ventured to insist on the
inherent rights of the people to alter or abolish government found
themselves accused of courting war, anarchy, secessionist views, and
placing society at the mercy of centripetal forces. Moreover, those
who advocated an expansive view of popular sovereignty in the de-
cades after the war also saw themselves branded as militant populists
who endangered the social fabric of American society in ways akin to
socialists, communists, immigrants, and trade union forces. Those
who repudiated the implications of an expansive view of popular sov-
ereignty increasingly insisted on making stability and order the pre-
dominant constitutional values.
Despite the reaction stimulated by the Dorr Rebellion and the
impact of the Civil War, debates in nineteenth century conventions
reveal the persistent elaboration of a constitutional position in defense
of the implications of an expansive view of popular sovereignty. In
the end, the opponents of an activist view of popular sovereignty suc-
ceeded in undermining claims of a legitimate constitutional middle
ground. Moreover, they carried the day by insisting on procedural
regularity as indispensable to constitutionally valid expressions of
popular sovereignty. While that legacy of proceduralism may be
deemed a salutary one, America's experience with written constitu-
tions shows it was far from inevitable.

